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overview of second-tier countries’ industry development models, explains Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy, and analyzes the policy effects of the defense 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
A. BACKGROUND 
Most of the nations around the world desire having their own defense industries, 
although this entails serious trade-offs among the resources of a country. The primary 
reason for desiring a nation’s own defense industry, in many cases, is the defense 
industry’s relationship to independence. Nations seek valuable resources to meet their 
defense needs and the most dependable defense industry is the domestic one.  
Developing a domestic defense industry has been a longtime desire for Turkey, 
going back to the establishment of the Turkish Republic, for several reasons: the first one 
is having a reliable source of armaments to follow an independent foreign policy; the 
second one is the set of experiences learned from history; the third one is terrorist attacks 
in Turkey’s Southeast regions; and the last one is its geographical and strategic position 
and nearness to conflict zones.  
This desire followed different paths during the history of the Republic. Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy was structured to achieve this goal in 1985 and 
revised in 1998. Several laws and regulations followed this revision, but the strategy 
developed in 1998 still serves as the basis for Turkey’s current defense systems 
acquisition policy. 
The analysis of this policy can be conducted from several angles; however, 
financial variables are the most reliable ones because of their objectivity. Financial 
variables of the Turkish defense industry, as a whole, are used to conduct this analysis.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the benefits and challenges of Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy. The primary focus is on policy effects on the defense 
industry and how the policy has changed the structure of the defense industry since its 
implementation. This research compares Turkey’s defense industry with other countries 
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and explores its relative position. Defense industry policies of first- and second-tier 
countries are identified in this research in order to provide insights and a comparative 
baseline about best practices. Finally, this research evaluates the future challenges of the 
Turkish defense industry and makes recommendations based on this evaluation.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this thesis is: “How did Turkey’s defense 
systems acquisition policy affect the defense industry over a decade? Other research 
questions that this thesis addresses are as follows: 
- What are the global trends in defense spending/military expenditure? 
- What are the global trends in the defense market? 
- What are the defense industry policies of first- and second-tier countries? 
- What is Turkey’s defense industry policy? 
- What are the sub-strategies to achieve the domestic industry objectives? 
- Why is having a domestic defense industry important for Turkey? 
- What is the relationship between defense spending and defense industry sales? 
- How did Turkish policy affect defense industry sales? 
- How did this policy affect money allocated for Research and Development? 
- How did this policy affect offset applications? 
- How did this policy affect current program structures? 
- What are the future challenges of the Turkish Defense Industry? 
D. SCOPE AND RESEARCH METHOD 
This thesis is limited to the analysis of financial variables and possible future 
challenges of the Turkish defense industry. Deductive methodology, from global defense 
spending to Turkish defense spending, and from the global defense industry to the 
Turkish defense industry, is used to analyze the policy effects on the industry. The 
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financial variables of developed countries and second-tier countries are used to structure 
comparative baselines that can be compared with the financial variables of the Turkish 
defense industry. The trends in Turkish defense industry variables between 1998 and 
2007 and current program structures are analyzed to measure the extent of policy effects 
on the defense industry. Finally, future challenges are analyzed to provide 
recommendations about possible opportunities for and threats to the Turkish defense 
industry. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter I, Introduction, provides a basic overview of this thesis, including the 
purpose of the thesis, the research questions to be answered in this thesis, and the scope 
and research method to be utilized. 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a background of major variables from the 
global perspective that is used to analyze the effects of Turkey’s defense systems 
acquisition policy on the defense industry. World defense spending trends, defense 
market trends, defense acquisition policies of major players in the defense market, and 
second-tier industry development models are the variables that are explained in this 
chapter.   
Chapter III, the Defense Systems Acquisition Policy of Turkey, gives an overview 
about the historical development of the Turkish defense industry and the reasons to 
develop a domestic defense industry. This chapter also provides the background 
information about defense systems acquisition policy and sub-policies, financial 
resources of Turkish defense spending, and the structure of the Turkish defense industry.  
Chapter IV, Analysis of the Effects of Turkey’s Defense Systems Acquisition 
Policy on the Defense Industry, analyzes the policy effects on the defense industry. 
Financial variables of the defense industry, such as defense spending, defense industry 





acquisition program structures, are used as the primary variables to measure the policy 
effects over a decade. In the first part of this chapter, regression analysis is conducted to 
find out the relationship, if any, between defense spending and industry sales. 
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, provides a summary of the 
findings and makes recommendations based on those findings. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides a background of major variables from the global 
perspective that is used to analyze the effects of Turkey’s defense systems acquisition 
policy on the defense industry. World defense spending trends, defense market trends, 
defense acquisition policies of major players in the defense market, and second-tier 
industry development models are the variables that are explained in this chapter. 
The primary purposes of this chapter are: to give an overview about the global 
trends in defense spending and the defense market, to explain the defense industry 
policies of major players in the defense market, and to give an overview about second-
tier countries’ industry development models. This chapter answers the following research 
questions:  
 What are current trends in defense spending?  
 What are the current trends in the defense market?  
 What are the defense industry policies of major players in the defense 
market? 
 What are industry development models of second-tier countries? 
The first subject explored in this chapter is defense spending. Defense budget of a 
country mostly constitutes the discretionary part of the government budget and it depends 
on income from taxation and the balancing of many national priorities. The trade-off 
among resources may affect the money allocated for defense. However, all other aspects 
being equal, a change in defense spending reflects mostly the change in threat assessment 
because countries spend their money on defense based on perceived threat. The increase 
or decrease in defense spending, including procurement, personnel, operation and 
maintenance spending, mostly shows the increase or decrease of security concerns. From 
the defense industry perspective, these increases or decreases are very important for their 
assembly lines and their future and must be watched. Defense spending includes the 
demand for defense systems. After the Cold War era, the main reason for the company 
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mergers and acquisitions in the defense industry was the decrease in demand. The 
companies that recognized the decreasing demand responded to this trend and 
consolidated in order to keep from going out of business. 
The second subject explored in this chapter is the global defense market. The 
defense market and the trends in this market show a country’s relative position compared 
to other nations and the competitive power of a country’s defense industry. None of the 
defense companies operate in isolation and they shape their structure according to 
competing parties in order to sustain themselves. In order to determine the competitive 
power of a country’s defense industry and its companies, the structure of the market and 
competing parties must be considered. Measuring some aspects, such as technological 
edge and the ability to strategically partner with other companies, of a defense company 
is very difficult to measure and in some cases they may be more important than their 
financial positions, however, their financial position is mostly the major variable that 
shows their competitive power.  
The third subject explored in this chapter is defense systems acquisition policies 
of major players in the defense market. Major national players in the defense market are 
driving forces and they shape both today’s and tomorrow’s defense market. Their 
acquisition policies and the means they use to develop or sustain their industrial base 
must be considered in order to exploit the benefits of their best practices and their 
experiences. 
The fourth variable explored in this chapter is second-tier industry development 
models. These models are important to explore the reasons of failures, if any, and to 
determine the required actions for the Turkish defense industry. 
B. DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE WORLD AND MAJOR REGIONS 
There are many definitions for “defense spending,” from several sources; most of 
them divide it into four categories: personnel, equipment, training, and operations. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) defines it in a broader concept. 
Defense spending or military expenditure is presented by SIPRI as follows:  
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“Where possible, SIPRI military expenditure includes all current and capital 
expenditure on:  
- The Armed Forces, Including Peace Keeping Forces  
- Defense Ministries and Other Government Agencies Engaged in Defense 
Projects  
- Paramilitary Forces When Judged to Be Trained, Equipped and Available for 
Military Operations  
- Military Space Activities  
Such Expenditures Should Include: 
 - Personnel  
 All Expenditures on Current Personnel, Military and Civil 
 Retirement Pensions of Military Personnel 
 Social Services for Personnel and Their Families  
 - Operations and Maintenance  
 - Procurement  
 - Military Research and Development  
 - Military Construction  
 - Military Aid (in the Military Expenditures of the Donor Country)”1 
 
Defense spending mostly constitutes the discretionary part of any government 
budget; therefore, deciding how much to spend on defense is always a hard question and 
always includes serious tradeoffs: between “Guns and Butter” and between “today and 
tomorrow.” The money allocated for defense is spent either to meet today's urgent needs 
or to shape tomorrow’s force structure. Defense and non-defense spending differ in many 
ways. Defense spending is an instrument for foreign policy and is always monitored by 
other countries. They do not care much about how much a country spends on education 
or social security. Although political effects, international relations, and foreign policy 
 
 
                                                 
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “The SIPRI Definition of Military 
Expenditure”. http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_definition.html (accessed December 20, 
2008). 
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play important roles, threat assessment is the major driver for the defense spending of all 
countries. Every country decides how much to spend on defense mostly according to their 
own threat assessment.2 
After World War II, defense spending had an increasing trend. During the Cold 
War era, the arms competition between two blocks of the world made defense spending 
the number-one priority. However, after the Cold War, the general trend of defense 
spending was negative until 2001. This date marked the change in the global trends in 
defense spending. When you look at the following graph, you will see that the year 2001 
is the turning point. The global average of world defense spending is largely affected by 
the United States, who makes up 45% of global defense spending. After 9/11, the U.S. 
had a big increase in its defense spending because of Iraq and Afghanistan operations. 
 
Figure 1.   World Military Expenditure 1998- 2007   
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2008, military spending, arms production, and 
international arms transfers are all on the rise: 
                                                 
2 L.R. Jones and McCaffery, Budgeting, Financial Management, and Acquisition Reform in the U.S. 
Department of Defense (Information Age Publishing 2008). 
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“- World military spending totaled $1339 billion in 2007, a real-terms increase of 
6% since 2006 and of 45 per cent since 1998; This corresponded to 2.5 per cent of 
world gross domestic product (GDP) and $202 for each person in the world.”  
- Arms sales by the 100 largest arms-producing companies in 2006 increased by 
8% in nominal terms over 2005; 
- International transfers of major conventional weapons were 7% higher over the 
period 2003-2007 than in 2002-2006.”3 
Most countries spend nearly 2-5% of their GDP on defense. The USA ranks first 
on military spending with 45% of the world total in 2007, followed by the UK, China, 
France, and Japan, with 4–5 % each. Fifteen major spenders in world are listed below. 
Rank Country Military Spending 








1 United States  547 45 1799 4 
2 UK  59.7 5 995 2.6 
3 China  [58.3] [5] [44] 2.1 
4 France  53.6 4 880 2.4 
5 Japan  43.6 4 339 1 
6 Germany  36.9 3 447 1.3 
7 Russia  [35.4] [3] [249] 3.6 
8 Saudi Arabia  33.8 3 1310 8,5 
9 Italy  33.1 3 568 1.8 
10 India  24,2 2 21 2.7 
11 South Korea  22.6 2 470 2.5 
12 Brazil  15.3 1 80 1.5 
13 Canada  15.2 1 461 1.2 
14 Australia  15.1 1 733 1.9 
15 Spain  14.6 1 336 1.2 
*[ ] Estimated 
Table 1.   Military Spending (in Market Exchange Rate)4 
                                                 
3 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”. 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
4 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”. 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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A brief overview of the following regions is given below: the United States, 
Western Europe, the Middle East and some other regions. 
1. The United States 
Since World War II, the defense spending of the U.S. has never been as high as it 
was in 2007. Military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were the major contributors to 
this increase. Since 2001, U.S. military expenditure has increased by 59% in real terms. 
The U.S. is by far the largest spender in terms of military spending: “The United States 
spends more than the next 45 highest spending countries in the world combined. The 
United States accounts for 48 percent of the world's total military spending. The United 
States spends on its military 5.8 times more than China, 10.2 times more than Russia, and 
98.6 times more than Iran. The United States and its strongest allies (the NATO 
countries, Japan, South Korea and Australia) spend $1.1 trillion on their militaries 
combined, representing 72 percent of the world's total.”5 
                                                 
5 Travis Sharp, “U.S. military spending vs. The world,” The Center for Arms Control and 
Nonproliferation. 
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/fy09_dod_request_global/ (Accessed 
December 12, 2008).  
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Figure 2.   The U.S. Defense Spending vs. the World 
2. Western Europe 
Due to its distance from conflict zones and its stabilized regional policies, 
Western Europe has the lowest growth rate in defense spending, at 6%.  
 12
 
Figure 3.   Military Expenditures in Western Europe6 
3. The Middle East 
Being the center of most of the conflicts and wars within the last few decades, the 
Middle East has one of the biggest increase rates in defense spending. The increase rate 
of the Middle East is 62% since 1998. High oil prices in recent years is another cause of 
this increase. 
 
Figure 4.   Military Expenditure in the Middle East 
                                                 
6 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.” 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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4. Other Regions 
Eastern Europe has the highest increase in military spending since 1998 with 
162%. Russia was the main contributor for this increase, with a 13% increase in 2007. 
China is another country that has increased its defense spending over the decades, 
but because of its rapid economic growth, its military spending is only 2.1% of the GDP. 
South Caucasus is the other region in which military spending has increased 
during previous decades, because of the conflicts in that region.  
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2008, “The number of countries that increased 
their military spending in 2007 was higher than in recent years. The factors driving 
increases in world military spending include countries’ foreign policy objectives, real or 
perceived threats, armed conflict, and policies to contribute to multilateral peacekeeping 
operations, combined with the availability of economic resources.”7 
5. The Relationship Between Defense Spending and Economic Growth 
Many studies have been conducted about the relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth. However, there is no consensus among economists on 
how defense spending affects the total output of a country.  
In some countries defense spending has negative impacts; however, in some it has 
positive impacts, and in some countries it may have no effect. A recent study conducted 
by Atesoglu showed that defense spending in the U.S. has positive impacts on the 
aggregate output of the U.S.8  
According to another study conducted by Halicioglu about Turkey, defense 
spending also has positive impacts on the aggregate output of Turkey.9 
                                                 
7 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.” 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
8 Sonmez Atesoglu, Defense Spending And Aggregate Output In The United States (School of 
Business, Clarkson University, NY, USA September 2007). 
9 Ferda Halicioglu, “Defense Spending and Economic Growth in Turkey: An Empirical Application of 
New Macroeconomic Theory,” Review of Middle East Economics and Finance 2004, 2(3), 193–201. 
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C.  THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. What is the Defense Industry? 
The “Defense Industry is a group of private or state-owned companies that, in 
constant contact with other industrial branches, designs, develops and produces all kinds 
of defense systems needed by the armed forces of a country.”10 The defense industry and 
any other industry differ mainly in the degree of need for extensive technology, the need 
for logistic support, the need for big investments, the need for secrecy and security, only 
one customer inside the country and political effects on foreign sales.  
2. Global Trends in the Defense Market 
The United States is the biggest player in the global defense market, holding more 
than 40% of the defense market, and is followed by the United Kingdom, Russia, and 
France. According to Defense News, the U.S. has 45 companies in the world’s top 100 
defense contractors list and 7 companies in the top 10. 
 
Country Companies Counted 
United States 45 











South Korea 1 
Singapore 1 
Finland 1 
                                                 
10 Husnu Ozlu, “Turkish Defense Industry After Second World War” (PhD diss. Dokuz Eylul 







Table 2.   Top 100 Defense Contractors - By Country11 
Rank  Company Country 
2007 Defense 
Revenue* 
% of Revenue from 
Defense 
1 Lockheed Martin U.S. $38,513.00 92 
2 Boeing U.S. 32,080.00 48 
3 BAE Systems U.K. 29,800.00 95 
4 Northrop Grumman U.S. 24,597.00 77 
5 General Dynamics U.S. 21,520.00 79 
6 Raytheon 1 U.S. 19,800.00 93 
7 EADS Netherlands 12,239.20 21.3 
8 L-3 Communications U.S. 11,239.70 81 
9 Finmeccanica Italy 10,601.60 53.6 
10 United Technologies U.S. 8,761.40 16 
 
Table 3.   Top 10 Defense Contractors - By Company12 
Lockheed Martin is the biggest defense contractor in the world and is followed by 
Boeing. BAE Systems ranks in third and the other two non-US defense contractors in the 
top ten are EADS from the Netherlands and Finmeccanica from Italy. Turkey has only 
one firm in this list of the top 100 defense contractors, ASELSAN, which ranks 86th in 
2008. In 2007, ASELSAN ranked 97th in this list. 
The global trends in the defense market have changed the rules of open market, 
from the defense companies’ perspectives. Countries are nearly following the same paths 
to keep themselves alive and to improve. Government protection, import limitations and 
restrictions, and different procedures for defense systems acquisitions are some of the 
means that most governments use. For underdeveloped and developing countries and 
                                                 
11 Defense News, “Top 100 Defense Contractors List.” 
http://www.defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/top100_08.php?c=FEA&s=T1C (Accessed 
January 9, 2009). 
12Defense News, “Top 100 Defense Contractors List.” 
http://www.defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/top100_08.php?c=FEA&s=T1C (Accessed 
January 9, 2009). 
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their young defense industries, taking part in global contracts and even in consortiums for 
government projects is becoming more and more difficult.  
The U.S., holding more than 40% of the global defense market, is performing the 
defense industry development model successfully, with overlapping defense and industry 
strategies, creating employment and increasing domestic production. The commercial 
competition between the U.S. and the E.U. shows its effects on the defense market. The 
European Union countries are restructuring their institutional infrastructure to enhance 
their collective acquisition systems and collective defense industries.13  
In order to respond competitively to mergers and acquisitions in the U.S., and to 
increase their effectiveness against increasing costs of defense systems, most of the 
companies working in the defense market all around the world are consolidating their 
powers with mergers and acquisitions. In every major activity field a couple of big 
companies are dominating the market. The Defense Ministers of European Union 
countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Sweden, and Spain 
decided to restructure the European defense industry. Based on their decision, the 
following companies now specialize in the following fields: 
- THALES, avionic systems and ship electronics  
- EADS, military and civilian aviation and space systems 
- BAE, military aviation, shipbuilding, avionics, and radar systems14    
In 2006, there was only one big deal, over $1 billion, in the defense industry. The 
number of big deals and mergers increased in 2007 to seven, and the largest of these 
deals was worth $4.8 billion. Six of these big buyers were U.S. companies. 
Four of the acquired companies rank among the SIPRI Top 100 arms-
producing companies for 2006: Armor Holdings, EDO Corporation, 
United Industrial Corporation and ARINC. In addition, three former 
subsidiaries bought in 2007 had arms sales large enough to rank them 
                                                 
13 Turkish Defense Industry Special Commission Report, “Ninth Development Plan” 2007, 6. 
www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/Download/3272/oik699.pdf (Accessed December 16, 2008). 
14 Defense Industry Special Commission Report, “Ninth Development Plan.” 2007, 6. 
www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/Download/3272/oik699.pdf (Accessed December 16, 2008). 
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among the Top 100: Devonport Management Ltd (DML, with arms sales 
of $780 million in 2006), Smiths Aerospace (sales of $1.3 billion) and 










(USA) Smiths Aerospace (UK) Smiths Group (UK) 4800 
BAE Systems 
(UK) Armor Holdings (USA) Publicly listed 4532 
URS Corporation 
(USA) Washington Group (USA) Publicly listed 3100 
Carlyle Group 
(USA) ARINC (USA) Privately owned Undisclosed 
ITT Corporation 
(USA) EDO Corporation (USA) Publicly listed 1700 
Meggitt (UK) K&F Industries (USA) Publicly listed 1300 
Veritas Capital 
(USA) Aeroflex (USA) Publicly listed 1300 
Textron (USA) 
United Industrial 
Corporation (USA) Publicly listed 1100 
Thales (France) 
67% of Alcatel Alenia Space 
(France) + 33% of 




Thales' Naval Operations 




Devenport Management Ltd. 
(DML) (UK) KBR (USA) 699 
Table 4.   The Largest Mergers and Acquisitions in 200716 
D. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICIES OF SELECTED 
COUNTRIES  
1. The United States 
The United States defense industry owes its prosperity mostly to the Cold War 
era. Huge domestic demand and competition between two blocks caused the U.S. defense 
                                                 
15 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
16 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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industry to flourish. However, after the Cold War ended, large budget cuts and decreases 
in military spending slowed this growth. Military spending in the defense sector declined 
from $422 billion in 1989 to $290 billion in 1999. This decline in demand forced defense 
industry companies to consolidate their power. According to a Pentagon report in 2003, 
the 50 largest defense suppliers of the early 1980s have become today’s top five 
contractors.17  
Between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. defense budget returned to Cold War levels, 
and today it almost accounts for half of the world’s defense spending. As mentioned 
earlier, the U.S. has the biggest defense industry in the world, and it has 45 companies in 
the Top 100 defense contractor list. According to a study conducted by E.C.YODER, in 
2003, 64.04% of $209 billion dollars spent for contract awards went to the Top 100 
defense contractors, and the Top 10 contractors received $83 billion, which constitutes 
39.72% of the total dollars that the U.S. expended. 18  
Sustaining the industrial base for defense asset production is the major challenge 
today’s U.S. defense industry is faced with. Growing Operations and Maintenance costs, 
because of aging equipment and increased equipment complexity, decreased the share of 
the acquisition budget, versus O&M budgets. O&M costs have increased since 1997 and 
comprised a 39% share of the DoD budget in FY2002. 19 
a. Acquisition Policy 
The United States defense systems acquisition policy is based on 
protecting the industrial base with laws and regulations. The Buy American Act, codified 
in 1933, and the Berry Amendment, codified in 1941 and amended by Congress in 2002, 
                                                 
17 Terrence R. Guay, “The Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and Their 
Implications,” Strategic Studies Issue 2005, 2. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=601 (Accessed December 26, 
2008). 
18 Elliot Yoder, “Engagement Versus Disengagement.”  Acquisition Research Paper Naval 
Postgraduate School November 2004, 12. http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperionimage.exe/NPS-AM-05-
001.pdf (Accessed December 26, 2008). 
19 L.R. Jones and J.L McCaffery, Budgeting, Financial Management, and Acquisition Reform in The 
US Department of Defense (Information Age Publishing 2008), 530-535. 
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are two examples of these regulations. However, there are many exceptions to these laws, 
and the authority to waive these laws was granted to the President in the implementation 
of international obligations and in favor of public interest. 20  
Acquisition policy requires close coordination between the government 
and industry representatives, and this relationship facilitates “political maneuvering to 
obtain the resources to invest in innovative projects.” 21 Political effects play an 
important role in U.S. defense spending allocation processes and on the defense industry. 
b. Export Policy 
As the biggest defense industry exporter in the world, the United States’ 
export policy is based on two programs. The first one is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
and the other one is Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). For FMS, the Department of State 
makes recommendations and the President designates the eligible countries; the same 
acquisition procedures and processes are used by the Department of Defense (DoD), on 
behalf of foreign governments. All DCS are subject to the approval of the Department of 
State, the U.S. Congress, and applicable export laws and regulations. DCS require the 
customer’s involvement in the process.22 
Export policy is based on sustaining technological superiority to ensure 
U.S. military dominance. In order to control and inform export decisions, two lists are 
developed: the first one is the Military Critical Technologies List (MCTL), and the 
second one is Developing Science and Technologies List (DSTL). The MCTL covers 
technologies that are of concern in the near term, while the DSTL covers those in the 
longer term. These lists are reviewed to decide whether the technology is critical or not 
and an export decision is given after this evaluation.23 
                                                 
20 Jason W. Bales and Nicholas G. Feranec,  “Defense Globalization: Impacts On The United States 
Defense Acquisition System,”  (Thesis diss. NPS, December 2007), 19-20. 
21 Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz, Buying Military Transformation (Colombia University Press 
2006), 26. 
22 DoD Security Cooperation Agency, “Overarching Description.” Frequently Asked Questions 
http://www.dsca.mil/pressreleases/faq.htm (Accessed December 10, 2008).  
23 GAO report, “DOD’s Critical Technologies Lists Rarely Inform Export Control and Other Policy 
Decisions.” July 2006, 1.  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-793 (Accessed December 12, 2008). 
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c. R&D Policy 
U.S superiority and its success rely heavily on the amounts that are 
allocated for research and development. During the Cold War, Russia was the biggest 
spender on R&D, but after it ended, the U.S. took the lead and increased its emphasis on 
R&D. The average R&D share of defense budget is the major indicator of this emphasis. 
Defense R&D spending had a 15% average share of the defense budget. “In fiscal year 
2005, U.S. defense R&D spending was $70.93 billion (2005 prices) and in 2006 the 
figure is $72.4 billion (current prices: AAAS, 2005). Some 7.5% of the 2006 defense 
R&D budget was allocated to defense research.”24 In 2008, the money allocated from the 
Federal Budget just for weapon systems development was $68.1 billion25 and the money 
allocated for the entire R&D portfolio was $137.972 billion.26 
d. Offset Policy 
The offset policy of the U.S. has changed several times in recent years. In 
first offset applications, Offset policy was a government responsibility and used as an 
instrument; to establish national defense industries, to improve economic structure of 
allied countries by providing employment, to provide regional stability, and used as an 
export tool. After 1978, the policy changed direction and responsibility was given to 
private military firms with some limitations. The most important limitation was 
technology transfer.27  
Governments became more sophisticated about using offsets to achieve 
their industrial and employment objectives. In 1998, defense offsets totaled $3 billion. 
With the increasing trend of offset, the U.S. became more concerned about offsets 
                                                 
24 Keith Hartley, “Defense R&D: Data Issues,” Defense and Peace Economics, December 2005, Vol. 
17(3), 169–175. 
25 American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Preliminary Analysis of R&D in the FY 
2008 Budget,” February 2007. http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/prel08p.htm (Accessed December 28, 2008). 
26 National Science Foundation, “President's FY 2009 Budget Requests 3.4% Increase in R&D 
Funding” http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf08312/ (Accessed March 14, 2009). 
27 Michael Woodward, “An Analysis of the Impact of Offset Requirements on the U.S. and Defense 
Industry” (Thesis diss. NPS 1995), 30-35. 
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because of their negative impacts. According to the GAO report in 2000, the U.S. did not 
gain what was expected from offset applications. Although it increased exports and 
defense industry sales, a great amount of employment opportunities went abroad. In 
many cases, “U.S. technology transfers improved foreign firms’ competitiveness but 
rarely resulted in technology transfer back to the United States.” Another concern was 
about contract values and competition because they could undermine fairness and 
competitiveness and could distort the price of the contract. 28  
In his article, Barry Marvell described the U.S. offset policy as follows: 
“The U.S. government’s official position, however, continues to be that offset inhibits 
world trade by compromising the transparency and level playing field of government 
acquisition. However, while offsets certainly complicate trade, it is difficult to object to 
offsets when the purchasing countries impose the requirements and the process is open to 
all competitors.”29 
According to the report prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
“During 1993-2006, U.S. companies reported entering into 582 offset agreements with 42 
countries related to export sales totaling $84.3 billion. These offset agreements were 
valued at $60 billion and equaled 71.2 percent of the export contract value, the same 
percentage as reported during the 1993-2005 period.”30 According to the same report, the 
U.S. should participate in joint productions instead of direct sales, which require offsets, 
in order to protect U.S. dollars from going abroad. 
 
 
                                                 
28 GAO, “Defense Trade Report,” May 2003, 1. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05234.pdf (Accessed 
December 12, 2008). 
29 Barry Marvel, “International Offset Practices,” Contract Management Magazine, May 2001. 
30 U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, “Offsets in defense Trade, 12th report to Congress,” 
December 2007, iv. 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/defenseindustrialbaseprograms/osies/offsets/12th_report_to_congress.pdf 
(Accessed January 12, 2009). 
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2. The European Union 
Developing a common defense industry policy and collective procurement 
structure is one of the biggest challenges of the EU today. Although the GDP of the EU is 
greater than that of the U.S. (in 2008 the EU’s combined GDP was over US$14.960 
trillion, compared to US$14.580 trillion for the USA)31, there is a huge gap between them 
from the defense industry sales and industry exports perspective. “While many EU 
politicians and officials may consider development of EU-wide armaments and defense 
industry policies desirable, there is no overriding imperative for the EU to do so.”32 
According to several EU officials, this approach is hard to sustain and the EU needs a 
powerful industry policy to maintain its technology baseline. Javier Solana, High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, stated that: “None of us can 
any longer afford to sustain a healthy and comprehensive DTIB (defense technology 
industrial base) on a national basis. The future health, maybe even survival, of Europe’s 
defense industry requires a European approach, and a European strategy. We must 
develop greater mutual reliance on diverse centers of excellence, and less dependence on 
non-European sources for key defense technologies.”33  
In order to develop a collective effort to structure a common policy for defense, 
the European Defense Agency (EDA) was established in 2004. The objectives of this 
organization are to harmonize defense requirements, to initiate collaborative efforts, to 
promote and enhance European procurement cooperation, to strengthen the European 
defense industry and technology base and to enhance the effectiveness of research and 
development in European defense.34  
                                                 
31 CIA, World Fact Book 2008, “Rank Order - GDP (purchasing power parity).” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (Accessed January 
5, 2009). 
32 Stefan Markowski and Robert Wylie, “The Emergence of European Defense and Defense Industry 
Policies.”  Security Challenges Journal Volume 3 number 2, 2007, 31. 
33 European Defense Agency, Press Release, “Radical Change and True European Market Needed to 
Secure Future of European Defense Industry,” February 1, 2007. 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=58 (Accessed December 12, 2008). 
34 European Defense Agency, Press Release, “Radical Change and True European Market Needed to 
Secure Future of European Defense Industry”,  February 1, 2007. 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/newsitem.aspx?id=58 (Accessed December 12, 2008). 
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A code of conduct related to defense procurement regulation was released by the 
EDA in 2005. This code of conduct is not binding and requires voluntary participation of 
European countries. The basic principles of this code are: “There will be mutual 
accountability, with the EDA monitoring how the code is respected or ignored, It will 
provide mutual assurance of security of supply, It will provide fair and equal treatment of 
suppliers, it will establish best practices and certain categories such as procurement of 
research and technology, collaborative procurements, and procurements of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear propulsion systems will be exempt from this code.”35 The success 
or failure of this code of conduct is still unknown but 22 EU countries approved this 
code.   
a. Industry Policy 
The European Union’s collective defense efforts and defense industry 
restructuring started at the beginning of the 1990’s. Until 1999 the efforts were limited to 
acquisition of small firms, joint ventures and multinational consortia. Political effects 
played a dominant role in hindering cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Most of the 
countries in Europe wanted to sustain their domestic defense industry structure. But at the 
end of the 1990’s, mergers and acquisitions became unavoidable because of economic 
and political pressure. The first consolidation occurred in the UK in 1999, and this 
consolidation was named BAE systems.36 Other consolidations followed, and after these 
consolidations, four firms dominated the European defense market: BAE Systems (UK), 
Thales (France), Finmeccanica (Italy), and EADS (multiple countries). After these 




                                                 
35Claire Taylor, “European Security and Defense Policy: Developments since 2003,” Library House of 
Commons, Research Paper 06/32, June 2006, 46.  
36 Terrence R. Guay, “The Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base: Restructuring Scenarios and Their 
Implications,” Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, 2005, 3. 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=601 (Accessed December 6, 2008). 
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has 3 firms in the Top 100 defense contractors list and the biggest one is BAE Systems, 
who bought Marconi and parts of Lockheed Martin and is seeking opportunities and 
market share in North America.37 
b. R&D Policy 
The two biggest differences between the defense markets of the U.S. and 
the EU come from the size of domestic demand and the R&D money allocated for 
defense. Economies of scale fed by huge domestic demand played a dominant role in 
developing U.S. defense industry structure. Although most of the defense industries in 
the EU are very high-tech domain and mostly funded by their own Ministries of Defense, 
there is a big gap between the R&D spending of European Countries and the U.S. The 
U.S. R&D spending was four times more than the EU’s R&D spending between 1997 
and 2001. Another difference in R&D spending is that in the U.S., the government’s 
assistance is much higher than in the EU. European companies spent 6.6% of their 
turnover on R&D in 2001 and 20% in 2006, whereas American companies spent only 
3.2% of their sales on R&D and other R&D money comes from government assistance.38  
c. Export Policy 
The EU Code of Conduct, which sets restrictions on arms exports to other 
countries, forms EU policy on exports. According to this code, arms transfer to the 
countries that may destabilize the region, and that are suspected of potential diversion or 
re-export to other countries are restricted according to this policy.. Another regulation 
about exports is in Article 296 of the Treaty on European Union which allows national 
governments to exempt defense equipment trade from EU scrutiny.39 Offsets are used as 
a powerful export tool all over Europe. 
                                                 
37Katia Vlachos-Dengler, Off Track? The future of the European Defense Industry (International 
Defense Research Institute, RAND Publications 2004), 13. 
38 Katia Vlachos- Dengler, Off Track? The future of the European Defense Industry (International 
Defense Research Institute, RAND Publications 2004), 105. 
39 Katia Vlachos- Dengler, Off Track? The future of the European Defense Industry (International 
Defense Research Institute, RAND Publications 2004), 80. 
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d. Offset Policy 
The same article mentioned in the previous paragraph, Article 296, gives 
EU members equal opportunity as in exports. The offset policy of a country is not under 
scrutiny of the EU. For this reason, every EU country has adopted different offset 
policies, in order to exploit the benefits of offsets. The commonality of their offset 
policies is the required percentage. Most European countries require 100% offset on their 
procurements. For example, the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands all 
require 100% offset on their procurements.40 
e. Major Countries in the EU 
(1) The United Kingdom. As a response to the changing global defense 
market, The UK introduced their Defense Industrial Policy in 2002, which affirmed 
government support for defense exports. Whatever changes the Defense Industrial Policy 
will bring about, support for defense exports will continue to be a part of UK policy. “In 
2004, new defense export orders won by UK industry were valued at four and a half 
billion pounds. This helped maintain the UK’s position as the most successful defense 
exporter in Europe, and second only to the U.S. world-wide.”41 
The aim of UK defense procurement is: “to buy equipment for the Armed 
Forces that meets their requirements and timescales with the best value for money.” 
Every year the Ministry of Defense (MOD) spends around £12 billion on goods and 
services. No other organization in the United Kingdom spends more on such a wide range 
of acquisitions, from military equipment to food, stores, and clothing.42 
 
                                                 
40 U.S. Department of Commerce/BIS offset database, “Offsets in defense trade eleventh report to 
Congress”, January 2007. 
41Gavin Mackay, “Governmental Initiatives in Defense Exports”. Senior Military Advisor to Defense 
Export Service Organization (DESO), SSM defense industry Conference 2007. 
42Defense Systems Management College, “A Comparison of the Defense Acquisition Systems of 
France, United Kingdom, Germany And The United States,”  3-16. http://www.dau.mil/pubs/misc/acq-
comp-euro00.pdf (Accessed December 26, 2008). 
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The Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) is the single biggest purchaser 
of manufactured goods in the United Kingdom. The DPA buys over £5 billion of new 
systems, equipment, and initial logistics support for the Armed Forces each year. In the 
UK, foreign contractors are free to bid for the majority of MOD business; as prime, or as 
subcontractors. But the evaluation of these bids is made under the considerations of 
security, international obligations, and special factors that may affect the government. 
Offsetting some of the value of a contract is another important factor that is considered 
while evaluating the bids. Many countries have registered partnerships and collaborations 
in the UK in order to do business with the government easily.43 
The Defense Export Service Organization (DESO), whose role is to assist 
defense companies and overseas customers interested in British defense products, and 
ministers actively participate on behalf of defense firms, assisting defense industry 
companies in finding customers around the world.44 
(2) Germany. The Federal Office of Military Technology and 
Procurement, “Bundesamt für Wehrtechnik und Beschaffung” (BWB), is the major 
organization in Germany that is responsible for the definition, development, engineering, 
test and evaluation, production, and procurement of military weapon systems.45 Germany 
has the third largest defense budget in the EU.  
The German defense industry is totally privately owned and major 
producers in the defense market have substantial civilian components. But this private 
ownership is not a burden for acquisition authorities and they work closely with industry 
 
 
                                                 
43 Defense Systems Management College, “A Comparison Of The Defense Acquisition Systems Of 
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44 Jocelyn Mawdsley and Michael Brzoska, “Procurement, Arms Exports and Industrial Offsets in 
Britain and Germany” Arms Trade Offsets: Theory, Policy, and Case Studies, London, Routledge, 2004, 
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authorities. Competition is very limited and certain companies, in many cases consortia, 
are preferred suppliers for certain types of defense systems. Direct offsets have played an 
important role in building and supporting the German defense industry.46  
(3) France. The Minister of Defense, assisted by the Joint Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff, is the main authority to implement defense in France.47  Direction 
Generale de l’Armement (DGA), an organization created in 1961, is responsible for 
procuring the necessary equipment for the French Armed Forces.48 France has the second 
largest budget in the EU. Until the end of the 1990s, French defense industry policy was 
based on high state control and ownership of firms. At the end of the 1990s, privatization 
of French firms began and France started putting more emphasis on collective defense 
industry policy for the EU. “This policy is based on a principle of competitive autonomy 
relying on domestic suppliers but also on European capabilities.” France played a 
significant role in creating today’s European collaborative programs and the development 
of Europe’s new armament policy, the “Joint Armament Cooperation Office (OCCAR),” 
which aims at restructuring the defense industry in Europe. The A-400M transport 
aircraft, Tiger and NH 90 Helicopters, Multi-Mission frigate, Meteor and Aster missiles, 
and earth observation satellites are some of the programs that are being developed under 
OCCAR.49 French politicians, especially at the ministry level, play an important role in 
assisting defense companies in finding customers around the world. For example, in his 
latest tour to Persian Gulf countries, French President Nicolas Sarkozy signed several 
agreements for French defense industry products.50 
                                                 
46 Jocelyn Mawdsley and Michael Brzoska, “Procurement, Arms Exports and Industrial Offsets in 
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49Patric Auroy, “The French approach to a European defense industrial base” (European Affairs 
Publication June 2007). 
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E.  DEFENSE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT MODELS OF SECOND-TIER 
COUNTRIES 
Countries have many incentives or reasons to develop their own defense industry.  
These reasons may include seeking an independent defense capacity, providing 
employment to citizens, driving the country’s economic development, and spurring the 
growth of new industries and new technologies.51 For example, for the U.S., the most 
important incentive for having a domestic defense industry is National Security concerns; 
for Israel, as an island in the Arabian Sea, their defense industry is the means to a 
sustainable existence in this region; for Turkey, both sovereignty and having an 
independent foreign policy depend heavily on the defense industry. 
Although there are several reasons behind having a domestic or national defense 
industry, the most important reason is having an independent defense capacity. In order 
to sustain sovereignty, a country needs a reliable source of defense capacity and usually 
the most reliable one is a domestic defense industry. 
All countries follow similar paths to developing their own defense industry. 
Bitzinger compiled a list of four common models.52 
Model 153 
1- Overhaul and service of imported weapons 
2- Licensed assembly of foreign weapons 
3- Manufacture of less complex components 
4- Increasing local design and manufacture of components 
5- Independent R&D and production 
                                                 
51Richard A Bitzinger, Towards a Brave new Arms Industry (Oxford University Press 2003), 11-15. 
52 Richard A Bitzinger, Towards a Brave new Arms Industry (Oxford University Press 2003), 16-17. 
53 James Everett Kattz, Arms Production in Developing Countries  (Lexington Books 1984), 9.  
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Model 254 
1- Initial import of arms from foreign suppliers 
2- Maintenance and overhaul of important weapons, including the manufacture of 
spare parts. 
3- Local assembly of imported subassemblies 
4- Limited local component manufacturing; local licensed assembly 
5- Some indigenous design and production, but important components imported 
6- Local licensed production of less advanced arms 
7- Local licensed production for most weapons; limited indigenous R&D and 
production of less advanced weapons 
8- Indigenous design, development and production of weapon systems  
 
Model 355 
1- Capability to perform simple maintenance 
2- Overhaul, refurbishment and rudimentary modification capability 
3- Assembly of imported components, simple licensed production 
4- Local production of components or raw materials 
5- Final assembly of less sophisticated weapons; some local components production 
6- Co-production or complete licensed production of less sophisticated weapons 
7- Limited R&D improvements to local licensed produced arms 
8- Limited independent production of less complicated weapons 
9- Independent R&D and production of less sophisticated weapons 
10- Independent R&D and production of advanced arms with foreign components 





                                                 
54 Janne Nolan, Military industry in Taiwan and South Korea (Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 45-46. 
55 Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (Cambridge 
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Model 456 
1- Servicing and repair of imported weapon systems 
2- Overhaul of imported weapon systems 
3- Local assembly of imported subassemblies 
4- Limited licensed production; assembly with some local components 
5- Some independent licensed production but important components are imported 
6- Local licensed production for most weapons; limited R&D on improvements and 
derivatives 
7- Limited R&D and production for advanced arms; R&D and production for less 
advanced arms 
8- Complete independence in R&D and production  
Although there are different steps in these models, developing a defense industry 
is a process that starts with maintenance and repair of imported systems and continues 
towards independent R&D and production; from extreme reliance on imported products 
to independent production. Initial armament production tends to rely heavily on imported 
technical assistance from countries having developed defense industries. The next step 
usually consists of the licensed production of foreign weapon systems. This is usually 
followed by limited indigenous development and production of relatively small 
armaments. These basic capabilities are supplemented by incremental improvements by 
R&D. Lastly, a country may attempt to design and develop its own advanced systems 
such as tanks, fighter aircraft, missiles etc. This process has been repeated over and over 
again in the case of the second- tier arms producing states.57   
R&D has special importance in every model and without R&D, industry 
development and independence cannot be achieved. Excepting a couple of countries such 
as Sweden or Japan, “Defense industrialization has failed to help second-tier arms 
producers attain an advanced level of independent military-technological innovation and 
development.”58 Analysis of these countries shows that limited or underdeveloped R&D 
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bases are the primary reason for this failure. Secondary reasons are “shortages of skilled 
personnel” and lack of scientific and technical infrastructures needed for innovative 
technology development.59 
F.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief overview about the current trends in defense 
spending and the defense market. The peace dividend after the Cold War era ended in 
2001. Defense spending started increasing after 2001 all over the world, due to high 
concerns about security. The U.S. has had the biggest role in this increase and U.S. 
spending constitutes 48% of world defense spending. The biggest increase since 1998 
belonged to Eastern Europe, with 162%, followed by the Middle East with 62%.  
The structure of the defense market reflects the defense industry power of 
countries. The defense market is mostly dominated by U.S. companies, and the U.S. has 7 
companies in the Top 10 defense contractors list and 45 companies in the Top 100 
defense contractors list. The U.S. is followed by the UK, with 1 company in the Top 10 
list and 10 companies in the Top 100 defense contractors list. In the Top 10 defense 
contractors list, the companies other than the U.S. belonged to European countries. 
Turkey had only one firm in the Top 100 list that ranked 86th. Although defense spending 
and demand for defense systems increased during the last decade, it was not enough to 
prevent mergers and acquisitions. Company consolidations with mergers and acquisitions 
continued throughout the last decade. Defense industry companies responded to the 
competition requirements and increasing cost of defense systems by consolidating their 
powers.  
This chapter also provided a brief overview of the policies of major players in the 
defense market. The U.S., as the biggest player in the defense market, owes its defense 
industry prosperity mostly to the Cold War era and the government’s emphasis on R&D. 
Sustaining their industrial base is the biggest challenge for the U.S. defense industry 
today. The U.S. strictly controls industry exports. Although offsets are used as a tool to 
boost defense industry exports, they are not a preferable method for federal governments, 
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because they are detrimental for both transparency of competitive market and world 
trade.     
Developing a collective defense and defense industry is the biggest challenge for 
the European Union and will likely continue being in the near future. Although some 
organizations were established to enhance European procurement cooperation, so far, 
their success has been limited to a couple of programs. The important points that come 
into prominence in European countries are: defense companies’ emphasis on R&D, more 
than state governments; high offset requirements in procurements, such as 100%; 
political support, especially at the ministry level, for defense industry exports; and 
reluctance of the biggest countries in Europe, such as France and Germany, to give up 
their own defense industrial bases and to put less emphasis on domestic production, 
which makes collaborative defense industry efforts unsuccessful.  
Finally, this chapter provided a brief overview about the defense industry 
developments of second-tier countries. Each country has different motives behind the 
desire to have their own defense industry. However, for the most part, the main reason is 
to have an independent defense capacity. Most second-tier countries have followed 
similar paths, starting with maintenance and repair of imported systems and continuing 
towards independent R&D and production; from extreme reliance on imported products 
to independent production. The most recent studies have shown that, except for a couple 
of countries, most second-tier countries have failed in their industry development efforts 
because of limited R&D or underdeveloped technology bases. Shortages of skilled 
personnel and technology structure needed for innovative technology developments were 
the main reasons for these failures. 
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III. DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICY OF TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives an overview of the historical development of the Turkish 
defense industry and the reasons to pursue a domestic defense industry. This chapter also 
provides background information about defense systems acquisition policy and sub-
policies, financial resources of Turkish defense spending, and the structure of the Turkish 
defense industry.  
This chapter primarily answers the question: “What is Turkey’s defense systems 
acquisition policy?” The other research questions explored in this chapter are: “Why is a 
domestic defense industry important for Turkey?”, “What are the financial resources of 
defense spending?”, and “How is the Turkish defense industry structured?” 
The first topic explained in this chapter is the historical development of the 
Turkish defense industry. Historical developments are important, because they show the 
reasons behind the desire for a domestic defense industry. In addition to all countries’ 
domestic defense industry desires, Turkey has unique reasons that make this effort a 
must.  
The second topic explained in this chapter is Turkey’s defense systems 
acquisition policy. Defense systems acquisition policy can be defined as the path and 
means used by the Turkish government for acquiring goods and services. This policy 
includes several sub-policies that support achieving the objectives.   
The third topic explained in this chapter is Turkish defense industry structure. 
This explanation is given from different perspectives, such as ownership and activity 
fields. 
The last topic explained in this chapter is the financial resources of the defense 
industry. This explanation provides background about the complexity of defense 
spending in Turkey and the reason behind non-transparent budget accounts.    
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B. THE HISTORY OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The history of the Turkish defense industry goes back to the Ottoman Empire. 
Until the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire was a superpower and was leading military 
technology. But with the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire 
lost track of technological developments and Europe took the lead in the military 
industry. 
After the First World War, Turkey had to close all their military facilities because 
of the Mondoros Ceasefire Agreement. After the Turkish Independence War (1919-
1923), serious attempts were made to establish a national defense.60 Establishing a 
national defense industry was the most important priority for the founder of the Turkish 
Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and he worked hard to achieve this goal. The industry 
started manufacturing national products for the Turkish Armed Forces at this time and 
continued until the Second World War.  
In 1924, maintenance and repair facilities for small arms / guns and 
ammunition were established in Ankara. Following this, we see a new 
ammunition production plant in 1927, brass production facility in 1928, 
Kayaş primer factory in 1930, Kırıkkale electrical plant and steel factory 
in 1931, gunpowder, rifle and artillery gun factory in 1936, and Mamak 
gas mask plant in 1943.61  
During World War II, the defense industry focused on the urgent needs of the 
armed forces, such as maintenance, ammunition, flame throwers, anti-tank ammunition, 
artillery ammunition, etc. The economic crisis caused by the Second World War deeply 
affected both the Turkish economy and the defense industry. Some of the military 
factories were closed during this time and others came to the stopping point. 62 
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Between 1950 and 1960, “[f]oreign military aid that started upon Turkey’s 
membership in NATO and increased initially, but within a short period stalled the 
development of local defense industry which was at its preliminary stage of formation. 
Instead of improving the local defense industry, foreign aid and foreign procurement 
were practiced during this period. Because of the Cold War and military and political 
polarization after the Second World War, Turkey met its defense requirements through 
the framework of NATO.”63 
Turkey’s Peace Operation to Cyprus in 1974 was an important event for the 
Turkish defense industry. A U.S. arms embargo imposed in Turkey showed the 
importance of national defense. This event accelerated the establishment of new 
government-supported enterprises, such as ASELSAN (1975), İŞBİR (1979), ASPİLSAN 
(1981), and HAVELSAN (1982).  
The 1980s were the reorganization period for the Turkish defense industry. “The 
first step in this direction was taken by the establishment of defense equipment 
Directorate as a state enterprise. However, the shortcomings stemming from its state-
bound status prevented its success and all the properties of that enterprise were 
transferred to the Under-secretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) which was established 
in 1985 under the Law No: 3238.”64 During this period, big defense industry projects 
such as the F-16 (1987), the Armored Personnel Carrier (1988), the Mobile Radar 
Complex (1990), Electronic Warfare Equipment for F-16, HF/SSB Radios, and the 
CASA Light Transport Aircraft (1991) started. A number of defense industry companies 
were established with foreign capital contributions, such as TAI (1984), TEI (1985), 
MIKES (1987), FNSS (1988), MARCONI KOMÜNİKASYON (1989), and THOMSON 
– TEKFEN RADAR (1990) to carry out the new projects.  
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In 1980s, a number of industrial private enterprises previously established 
for non-defence production, such as OTOKAR, MERCEDES, BMC, 
NUROL MAKİNA organised production lines for defence products and 
some companies such as ROKETSAN (1989) were formed by as private 
enterprises.65 
In 1987, the Foundation of Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces (Turk Silahli 
Kuvvetlerini Guclendirme Vakfi, or TSGV) was established and foreign shares in some 
companies mentioned above were bought by this foundation.  
In 1998, the Ministry of National Defense published the Defense Industry Politics 
and Strategy Document (Türk Savunma Sanayii Politikası ve Stratejisi, or TDIPS) which 
contained the government directive for the defense industry. This document redefined 
and restructured the framework of the Turkish defense systems acquisition policy. 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY HAVING ITS OWN DEFENSE 
INDUSTRY 
As a member of NATO, Turkey has the second largest armed forces following the 
U.S. This is primarily due to its geopolitical importance as a member of NATO and its 
strategic location in three main regions of crisis: the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the 
Middle East. Although there are ongoing efforts for this number to be reduced, the 
Turkish armed forces still rank among the 10 largest armies of the world, with others 
including the U.S., China, and India. The Turkish army in 2007 was made up of 402,000 
personnel, with the sheer size of the army posing various challenges for the military. The 
navy and air force are only a sixth of the size of the army, at 52,750 and 60,100, 
respectively.66 
Although the Cold War ended at the beginning of the 1990s, security problems, 
military conflicts among nations, and terrorist attacks maintained the need for the defense 
industry and arms production. International relations are subject to uncertainty and it is 
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never clear what will happen tomorrow. Because of this uncertainty, states throughout the 
world must be ready for involvement in conflicts, for terrorist attacks, and unpredictable 
situations in general.  
In order to cope with these problems, every country pursues a variety of policies. 
Some put more emphasis on domestic arms production, while others buy from different 
countries.67 This choice includes a serious tradeoff among resources and choosing a 
domestic or national defense industry includes a big opportunity cost. It requires huge 
investment to establish and a lot of money to sustain.  
Depending on foreign countries for national defense may cause serious problems 
in a conflict. Countries that you depend on may control their weapons according to their 
political reasoning and may not allow you to use them. In such a situation, money is not 
enough to buy a weapon system. “In order to defend its territory satisfactorily, a nation 
state requires a reliable source of armaments, and the most reliable one is generally a 
domestic one.”68 
In addition to the common reasons for developing a domestic defense industry, 
Turkey has three major unique reasons for developing its own industry. The first reason 
is experience learned from history, the second is terrorist attacks that occur in Turkey’s 
Southeast regions, and the third is its geographical and strategic position and nearness to 
conflict zones. 
Turkey encountered problems as a result of not having its own defense industry 
twice in its history. The first one was in 1974, during the Cyprus Peace Operation, and 
the other one was in 1993, when Germany placed an embargo on using arms against 
terrorists. The first embargo affected Turkey seriously, because Turkey had too heavily 
depended on the U.S., and most of their weapons and equipment were either from U.S. 
aid or procured from the U.S. in other ways. The second embargo did not have a serious 
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effect on the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) because there were only a limited number of 
arms subject to this embargo in the TAF. However, the lesson gained from this embargo 
was clear: Turkey must have its national defense industry.   
Fighting with terrorists since 1984 is another reason for Turkey’s defense industry 
development efforts. The never-ending fight, changing fighting techniques, and the need 
for new equipment based on new requirements made defense industry development a 
high priority for Turkey. At the beginning of this fight, common belief was that the 
terrorist problem would be cleaned up in a short time, and for this reason, defense needs 
were considered urgent, and they were fulfilled from foreign suppliers. After realizing 
that too much money had gone abroad and no value had been added to the domestic 
defense industry because of these urgent procurements, new efforts to fulfill these needs 
from domestic resources were taken. Some Turkish companies, such as ASELSAN and 
HAVELSAN, developed electronic systems, and OTOKAR developed Cobra, a light, 
wheeled armored vehicle, in order to meet the requirements of Turkey’s conflicts with 
terrorists. But these efforts were not enough for a country fighting with terrorists for more 
than two decades. Fighting with terrorists was not the epicenter of developing a domestic 
defense industry. For example, mine threats and remote-controlled explosives were not a 
new technique for Turkey, but have been used for a long time; however, nothing was 
developed by the Turkish defense industry to be used against this threat until this year. 
After seeing the U.S. commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solution to its existing problems 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, BMC (British Motor Corporation) Company started developing 
the Turkish version of MRAPs (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) in 2007.69 Another 
example is UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), which are currently the best tool to 
control remote areas and borders. Terrorists have been using mountainous and remote 
areas since 1984 and nothing was developed domestically to control these areas. Finally, 
last year, three Herons (a type of UAVs) were bought from Israel and an agreement was 
made to buy seven more in following years at a cost of $183 million.  
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Turkey’s strategic position and nearness to conflict zones is the final major reason 
for the importance of Turkey developing its own defense industry. Turkey is 
geographically in the middle of most of today’s and previous years’ conflict zones. It is 
located between Europe and Asia, and its neighbors are Iran, Iraq, the Republic of 
Georgia, and Armenia in Asia, and Greece and Bulgaria in Europe. The history and 
current status of these countries prove that a conflict can very suddenly erupt in this 
region. The Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, the U.S.’ Operation Freedom of Iraq in 2003, 
the clash between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and never-ending disputes between 
Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea are some examples of these conflicts. Surviving 
in this region, and sustaining independent foreign policy based on national interests, 
depends heavily on an independent defense capability that can develop modern 
equipment, tools, and devices.  
D.  DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICY OF TURKEY 
Defense systems acquisition policy is defined in this thesis as the path and means 
used by the Turkish government for acquiring goods and services. The objective of this 
policy is to create a sound domestic defense industry that can satisfy government needs. 
The means or sub-policies that are used to support this objective can be listed as industry 
policy, export policy, R&D policy, and offset policy.  
In Turkey’s defense systems acquisition process, the following institutions have 
the following roles and responsibilities: the Council of Ministers decides the general 
strategy; the Defense Industry High Coordination Board is responsible for guiding 
directives; the Defense Industry Executive Committee is responsible for decision-
making; the Turkish General Staff is responsible for requirement generation; the MND 
(Ministry of National Defense)  and Undersecretariat for Defense Industries are 






Defense Industry Audit Board is responsible for auditing and control; and universities, 
research centers, and companies are responsible for design, production, manufacturing, 
and R&D.70 
As mentioned in previous pages, two resolutions structured the baseline of 
Turkey’s defense systems acquisition policy and defense industry development efforts. 
The first one is Law number 3238, about the establishment of the Undersecretariat for 
Defense Industries, and the second one is Resolution number 23378, which is titled “The 
Principles of Turkish Defense Industry Policy and Strategy.” 
1. Law Number 3238 
Although Turkey has faced many problems as a result of not having a domestic 
defense industry, there was not any serious attempt to develop such an industry until Law 
number 3238 in 1985. The basic structure of the defense industry until that time was that 
state-dominated and private firms were prohibited from entering the defense market. In 
1985, the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries was established under Law number 
3238. This law introduced new principles to the defense industry, of which, the main 
principles were as follows: 
 “To make maximum use of Turkey’s existing industrial capabilities and 
potential,  
 To provide direction and assistance to new investments that contain high 
technology,  
 To incorporate foreign technologies and to render possible contributions by 
foreign capital,  
 To encourage research & development activities.”71 
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The basic objectives of this law were to structure a modern defense industry by 
using efficient administrative mechanisms, by using constant cash flows, and by having 
defense needs met from domestic suppliers to the fullest possible extent.  
In addition to the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, this law also 
established the Defense Industry Support Fund, the Defense Industry Executive 
Committee, and the Defense Industry Support Fund.72 
a. Defense Industry Executive Committee 
The Defense Industry Executive Committee is the main body of the 
decision-making process for critical defense-industry-related issues and major defense 
systems procurement decisions. The Prime Minister is the head of this committee, and the 
General Chief of Staff and the Minister of National Defense are the other members. 
b. Undersecretariat for Defense Industries and Its Role 
The mission and primary objective of the Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries is to put into practice the decisions of the Executive Committee. In order to 
achieve this objective, a special legal basis, special budget and financial resources are 
provided to SSM.(Savunma Sanayi Mustesarligi - Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries) The missions and tasks are defined as follows: 
Putting into effect the decisions taken by the Defense Industry Executive 
Committee,  
To reorganize existing Turkish Industry in line with the prerequisites of 
defense industry,  
To plan the production of modern arms and equipment at private and 
public sector entities,  
To realize research and development of modern arms and equipment, to 
have their prototypes built, to make advance payments, plan advance 
orders and determine other financial and economic supports,  
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To coordinate export and offset trade issues relating to defense industry 
products.73 
The SSM is carrying out billion-dollar projects and its procurement 
strategy can be listed as “Domestic Production,” which is given the highest priority, 
under “Joint Development and Consortium” and “COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) and 
Joint Procurement.”74 
c. Defense Industry Support Fund 
The Defense Industry Support Fund is a unique fund provided for the SSM 
to carry out its mission. What makes this fund special is its high flexibility and 
bureaucracy-free structure. It provides constant cash flow to the SSM with full and 
independent control. Main incomes of this fund are: 
Allotments from corporate taxes,  
Fees and levies imposed on alcoholic and tobacco products, and all forms 
of chance games and betting, the lottery, etc.  
This fund has a special meaning for both the defense industry and 
acquisition officials. It supplements the Ministry of National Defense Budget with 
millions of dollars on procurements accounts. Since its establishment in 1986, 80% of 
$11 billion was spent on domestic production, 16% on direct procurement projects and 
4% on the Advanced Technology Industrial Park (ATIP) Project.75 
2. Resolution Number 23378 
Resolution number 23378 is the most important document to help shape Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy, because it clearly defines the objectives and sub-
policies to support and achieve these objectives. The Defense Industry Policy and 
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Strategy Document (TDIPS-Türk Savunma Sanayii Politikası ve Stratejisi) was approved 
by the Council of Ministers in 1998. Although this law has been supplemented by several 
laws and regulations since 1998, it still serves as the basis for defense industry policy. 
The objective of this resolution is to satisfy the needs of the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) from national and domestic resources to the fullest possible extent. This 
Policy document includes the ways and principles of developing a national defense 
industry. 
In this Policy document, the defense industry is differentiated from other 
industries by the following special characteristics:  
 Sensitive manufacturing techniques, depending upon high technology 
structure,   
 Special quality standards,  
 Skilled and experienced workforce,  
 Big investment requirements and high dependency on R&D activities, 
 Only one buyer and limited demand-based production  
 Openness to foreign markets to sustain continuous production, and  
 Security and secrecy requirements. 
Because of previous reasons, the defense industry requires close control and 
support of the government.76 
Turkish defense industry policy objectives are defined in this document as 
follows: 
The Turkish defense industry must: 
- Be open to domestic and foreign companies, 
- Be dynamically structured, 
- Be adaptable to new technologies and capable of developing new 
technologies, 
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- Be powerful enough to compete in the world defense market and have 
export potential, 
- Be capable of renewing own technology structure, 
- Be able to cooperate with friendly and allied countries, 
- Exploit existing industry potential and be exempt from duplications, 
- Possess alternative industry fields, and 
- Possess concrete infrastructure.  
This policy document defines the following strategies and means required to 
achieve the objectives of defense industry policy: defense industry strategy, weapon 
systems classification strategy, export strategy, R&D strategy, and offset strategy. 
a. Defense Industry Strategy 
The Turkish National Defense Industry Strategy is based on several 
factors. In order to provide national security and to meet the needs of the Turkish Armed 
Forces securely and in a consistent manner, the national defense industry must be 
encouraged and supported by the government, and defense systems requiring high 
technology must be produced inside the country. To achieve this objective, the 
government must assist defense industry firms to establish manufacturing facilities with 
satisfactory technology structure. “The goal of technology acquisition is the primary 
objective at the center of this industrial model. It is aimed that the technologies should be 
classified and according to these classifications, principles of supply should be 
formulated such that technology shall be acquired and then domesticated and improved, 
becoming a part of the supply process.”73 
The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is the coordinating authority to 
perform this strategy. The MND should coordinate the points mentioned in this document 
with essential government agencies, defense industry firms, universities, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to exercise this policy according to international agreements. 
 45
b. Weapon Systems Classification Strategy 
Since satisfying all the needs of the TAF from domestic sources is not 
feasible or economical, defense systems are separated into three categories: 
Systems/Technologies that have to be national, projected to be developed inside the 
country in the long run; Critical Systems/Technologies, that are projected to be developed 
inside if possible, and if not, must be developed with joint production; and Other 
Systems, projected to be procured from the sources that provide the lowest life cycle cost 
and best quality based on multiple source acquisition policy. The list of these system 
categories is determined by the Ministry of National Defense and updated according to 
the needs of the TAF.   
According to this document, “having appropriate national classified 
facility security document” is a must for the systems that have to be national. If this is not 
possible, a subcontractor and main contractor application is used. The companies that do 
not have this clearance can only be subcontractors.  A main contractor must be a national 
firm and has the authority to choose subcontractors. For equipment procurements and 
system acquisitions, domestic firms always have priority. For the systems or equipment 
that will be procured from abroad, priority is given to the firms that provide direct or 
indirect offset applications to the domestic industry. 
c. Export Strategy 
In this document, export is considered an important means to providing a 
more rational production capacity, a foreign currency inflow mechanism, and a 
sustainable industrial base. All kinds of promotion and credit, within the limits of 
financial resources, are encouraged for friendly and allied countries eager to buy defense 
industry products. The promotion of the defense industry is made through a single 
channel and financial support is provided by the state.77 
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d. R&D Strategy 
According to TDIPS document, the responsibility to conduct R&D 
activities is under the coordination of the MND. The primary institution commissioned 
for this purpose is the SSM. The objectives of R&D policy are defined by the SSM as:  
Expanding R&D activities in Turkish Industry, and consequently 
achieving high technology and developing a modern defense industry; 
Directing current local R&D potential to intermediate and long range 
military requirements, first dealing with projects that will provide development of a local 
technology base and then using this base to acquire engineering development and 
manufacturing data package capabilities;  
Promoting basic research projects, which can significantly contribute to 
the development of national technology in the near future and prototype development 
projects that will allow modernization or overhaul/maintenance of systems currently in 
service in the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), and 
Supporting and organizing multidisciplinary projects for the optimization 
of the capabilities of universities and R&D institutions, along with industry 
participation.78 
Early in the year 2000, in order to increase the domestic contribution rate, 
a new R&D policy, in addition to a new industry policy, was adopted by the SSM and 
announced to all universities, research institutions, and defense industry companies. The 
policy objectives were defined as: expanding R&D activities, directing current domestic 
R&D projects, promoting basic research projects and prototype development projects that 
would contribute to national technology in the near future, and supporting and organizing 
industry and institution participation in creating a modern defense industry.79 The 
primary objective of this policy was to harmonize R&D activities to achieve the modern 
defense industry objective. 
 47
e. Offset Strategy 
Offset directive and offset policy was stated in Law 3238 as: 
Industrial participation/offset (ip/o): Within the scope of the projects, the 
transactions which will be executed to use the production potential and 
capabilities of local industry, to increase the competitiveness of the local 
industry in the international markets and to provide technological 
cooperation, investment and R&D opportunities are defined as industrial 
participation/offset. 
The objectives of Turkey’s offset policy can be listed as follows: “…to 
protect and improve the local defense industry, to provide transition flexibility for 
military and civil products, to contribute to the modernization of the technological 
infrastructure, to set possible grounds for the integration of local-foreign companies.”80 
A new offset directive was approved in 2007, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of offset applications and increase the domestic share in procurement 
projects,. According to this directive, the new threshold for offsets is determined as being 
$10 M, the offset obligation is determined as 50% of contract value, and the fulfillment 
period is determined as delivery plus two years. The category for indirect offset 
obligations, nondefense products and services, was removed from the offset directive. To 
increase exports, and to promote defense industry company shares in international 
markets, domestic defense industry company contracts were covered under offset in this 
new policy.81 
The objectives of this policy are summarized by Mustafa Egeli, from 
HAVELSAN, as: “The SSM's mission under the industrial participation and offset 
directive 2007 is clear -- continued promotion and enhancement of the Turkish defense 
industry through quality, win-win offset programs. Prospective contractors will be 
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Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements Conference, Ankara, Turkey, May 24 2007).   
81Goknur Pilli, “SSM Presentation” (Paper presented at Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries,,Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements Conference, Ankara, Turkey, May 24 2007). 
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required to guarantee work share, technology transfer, and/or strategic partnership with 
eligible Turkish companies under future defense programs as part of their offset 
commitments.”82 
E.  FINANCIAL RESOURCES FOR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 
Turkey, as a member of NATO, does not have transparent defense spending. “The 
Ministry of National Defense (MND) budget is supplemented by the budgets for the 
Gendarmerie, Coast Guard, and Turkish Defense Industries Undersecretariat (SSM). 
MND spending accounts for around 70 per cent of the total budget, the Gendarmerie 
around 17 per cent and SSM procurement 10 to 12 per cent.”83 Although the Ministry of 
National Defense has the biggest share of defense expenditures, it has many resources 
other than the MND budget. Financial resources for defense expenditures can be 
classified as follows: 
- Allocated resources from Ministry of National Defense,  
- Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF), 
- Foundation of Strenghtening Turkish Armed Forces,  
- General Command of Gendarme Budget, 
- Coast Guard Budget,  
- International loans, 
- Foreign military aids, and 
- Other MND incomes.  
According to a study conducted by Günlük-Şenesen, 1983-2001: personnel 
expenditure’s share consists of 40%, equipment’s share consists of 19%, and current 
expenditures consist of 38% of the MND budget.84 
                                                 
82 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “New Offset Policy to Boost Turkish Defense Exports,” Today’s zaman, May 
28, 2007. 
83 Jane's Defence, “Budgets – Turkey” July 4, 2008. 
84 Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, “Türkiye’de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri 1980-2001” 
(TESEV  publications 2002), 57-58. 
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According to the same study, on average, the Army’s share in the MND budget is 
21.9%, the Air Force’s share is 14.4%, the Navy’s share is 7.7%, the Ministry of National 
Defense’s share is 7.2%, and the General Chief of Staff’s Share is 7.1%. 
The Defense Industry Support Fund was established in 1985, under the control of 
the Turkish Central Bank, in order to structure a modern national defense industry that 
could compete with foreign defense companies. Furthermore, another objective of this 
fund is to provide stable resources for acquisitions, production, and modernization of 
defense systems, in addition to the general budget.85 Another purpose of this fund is to 
encourage and support private firms, who are not eager to take part in the defense 
industry because of the uncertainty and risks involved, to enter into the defense industry. 
Revenue and corporation taxes, the National Lottery Share, the tax share on alcohol and 
gasoline consumption, the special consumption tax share, shares on bet games, 
international loans, and resources transferred from the MND budget are some of the 
revenues of this fund.86 
According to the 2007 SSM Activity Report, Defense Industries Support 
Fund (SSDF) income, mainly comprising revenues from the state-run 
lottery, reached $2.459 billion in 2007, while $1.581 billion of this amount 
was spent primarily for arms acquisition, including an amount earmarked 
for local development of defense systems as part of the Turkish policy 
aiming to increase the local content of military projects to reduce the 
reliance on main systems abroad to 50 percent by the end of 2011.87 
The Foundation of Strengthening Turkish Armed Forces (FSTAF) revenues 
include the profits gained from owned or shareholding companies, foundation facilities, 
and donations. Between 1987 and 2000, Turkey’s defense expenditure consisted of 86% 
of the MND budget and 14% of FSTAF. Equipment expenditures in this period supplied 
54% from the MND budget and 44% from the FSTAF.88 
                                                 
85 H. Karahan Turk, “Türk Savunma Sanayinin Ekonomik Etkileri Ve Savunma Harcamalari-Büyüme 
İlişkisinin Ekonometrik Modellenmesi” (Thesis diss. Cukurova University, 2007), 29. 
86 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries. www.ssm.gov.tr (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
87 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey Spends More on Defense,” Today,s Zaman, Jan 16, 2009. 
88 Gulay Gunluk-Senesen, “Türkiye’de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri 1980-2001” 
(TESEV publications 2002), 10. 
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Foreign Military aids primarily consist of the loans and aids granted by the U.S. 
This aid started in 1947, after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine, to develop the 
Turkish economy and to provide military self-reliance against the USSR’s pervasion 
efforts. Since then, the U.S. has loaned and granted Turkey more than $12.5 billion in 
economic aid and more than $14 billion in military assistance.89 This aid followed a 
decreasing path in the last decade and in 2002, U.S. military aid resumed with $53.75 
million being provided through Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International 
Military Education (IMET) programs. In 2007, the U.S. provided $170 million to 
Turkey.90 The following table shows U.S. military aid since 2001 and forecasts until 
2010. 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
USD 
billions 0.02 0.54 0.2 0.4 0.37 0.18 0.17 0.1 0.12 n/a 
Table 5.   U.S. Military Aid to Turkey91 
F.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE TURKISH DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
The Turkish defense industry can be divided into three major parts from the 
shareholders’ perspective. The Turkish defense industry consists of government-owned 
companies, which constitute 31% of the industry; private companies, which constitute 
36%; and association-owned companies (Foundation of Stenghtening Turkish Armed 
Forces, FSTAF), which constitute 33%. The following figure represents this 
distribution.92 
                                                 
89 U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Turkey”. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3432.htm 
(Accessed December 26, 2008). 
90 Jane's Defence, “Budgets – Turkey”. July 4, 2008. 
91 Jane's Defence, “Budgets – Turkey”. July 4, 2008. 
92 M.Kaya Yazgan, “Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers”, May 2008, 3. www.sasad.org 










Figure 5.   Industry Structure (Ownership) 
The government-owned facilities are MKEK and plants owned by the TAF and 
MND; the TAFF (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation) owned companies are ASELSAN, 
TUSAS, HAVELSAN, ROKETSAN, ISBIR, and ASPILSAN; other companies are 
owned by private enterprises. 
Another classification can be made based on their activity fields: The companies 
working on naval platforms constitute 23%; electronics, 22%; weapons, ammunition, 
rockets, and missiles, 14%; land platforms, 13%; aerospace, 11%; information 
technologies, 8%; uniforms, 5%; and other activity fields constitute 4% of the Turkish 
defense industry.93 
 
                                                 
93 M.Kaya Yazgan, “Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers,” May 2008, 3. www.sasad.org 




















Figure 6.   Industry Structure (Activity Field)94 
 
The other classification of private enterprises can be made based on capital source 
and share proportion. Nurol Makine, STFA, Savronik, Kale Kalıp, OTOKAR, and 
İbrahim Örs are examples of national private companies. TAI, TEİ and FNNS are 
examples of foreign participation.95 
The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation has a special value in the Turkish defense 
industry. This foundation has shares in most of the biggest companies. For example, it 
has shares in military software company HAVELSAN (97.9%), military electronics 
company ASELSAN (85.9%)96, aerospace company TUSAS and ammunition and rocket 
company ROKETSAN (35.5%). 
G.  SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the history of the Turkish defense 
industry and the reasons underlying Turkey’s desire to develop their own defense 
                                                 
94 M.Kaya Yazgan, “Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers,” May 2008, 3. www.sasad.org 
(Accessed December 23, 2008). 
95A.Mithat Kiziroglu, “Savunma Sanayi Ve Özelleştirme Açisindan Değerlendirilmesi” (Thesis diss. 
Halic University, 2007), 62. 
96 Business Monitor, “Defense Industry Analysis - Turkey”, 2008, 5.  
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industry. Although the desire to develop a domestic defense industry is as old as the 
history of Turkish Republic, no serious attempts had been made until the beginning of the 
1990s. The primary reason for this negligence was the foreign aid that Turkey received, 
which was intended to help protect their armed forces structure against the Soviet threat. 
However, this aid was treated as an opportunity to invest resources in areas other than 
defense, instead of enhancing the defense industrial base.  
The primary reason for most countries exerting serious efforts towards structuring 
their own defense industry is the need for independent defense capability. In addition to 
reasons common to all countries for developing a domestic defense industry, Turkey has 
three major unique reasons for doing so. The first reason is experience learned from 
history, the second one is terrorist attacks in Turkey’s Southeast regions, and the third 
one is its geographical and strategic position and nearness to conflict zones. 
This chapter also provided a broad overview of Turkey’s defense systems 
acquisition policy and strategies, in order to provide background about the variables that 
are used in the following chapter to measure the policy effects. All these policies and 
strategies are aimed at developing a defense industry that can satisfy government needs 
with the best quality. Since this objective cannot be achieved in a short period of time, the 
strategies are developed, as explained in second-tier industry development models, to 
reach the desired level in an orderly manner. The policy can be summarized as an order 
of precedence, domestic production, consortiums, joint production, and direct 
procurements with offset.  
Similarly, this chapter provided an overview of the defense company structures 
and financial resources of Turkey. From the ownership perspective, the defense industry 
can be divided into three parts: government-owned companies, private companies, and 
foundation companies. From the activity field perspective, it is dominated by the 




Financial resources of Turkish defense spending are very complicated; however, 
the structure and legal basis provided for the Defense Industry Support Fund provides the 
SSM, the main body of defense acquisitions, high flexibility and constant cash flow to be 
able to carry on its mission.  
 55
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF TURKEY’S DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS ACQUISITION POLICY ON THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the effects of Turkey’s defense policy on 
the defense industry. Financial variables of the defense industry, such as defense 
spending, defense industry sales, defense industry exports, the money allocated for R&D, 
offsets, and current acquisition program structures, are used as the primary variables to 
measure the effects of policy over a decade. In the first part of this chapter, regression 
analysis is conducted to find out the relationship, if any, between defense spending and 
industry sales.  
In the second part of this chapter, deductive methodology is used to conduct an 
analysis of financial variables. Financial variables of major players in the defense market 
and of second-tier countries are used to provide a comparative baseline, and past data 
about selected financial variables are used to measure the relative position of the Turkish 
defense industry, among other defense industries.  
In the third part of this chapter, the current structures of defense acquisition 
programs are analyzed to measure the extent of how the order of precedence of defense 
systems acquisition policy has structured today's acquisition programs.  
In the last part of this chapter, future challenges of the defense industry are 
analyzed to give an overview of the possible threats and opportunities that must be 
considered and to make recommendations about the prospective challenges of defense 
systems acquisition policy. 
This chapter answers the primary research question, “How did Turkey’s defense 
systems acquisition policy affect the defense industry over a decade?” The other 
questions answered in this chapter are: “What is the relationship between defense 
spending and industry sales?”, “How did this policy affect industry exports?”, “How did 
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this policy affect money allocated for R&D?,” “How did this policy affect offset 
applications?,” “How did this policy affect the structure of current programs?,” and 
“What are the challenges of this policy?”   
B.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENSE SPENDING AND 
INDUSTRY 
Defense spending or defense expenditure is the most important variable in 
analyzing government defense policy, because the amount of money spent on defense 
emphasizes its priority in a government budget. In other words, defense expenditure and 
where it is spent shows what is important from the government’s perspective and how the 
money allocated for this purpose is used. For this reason, the first part of this chapter 
analyzes the relationship between defense spending and defense industry sales to find out 
how government policy affected the defense industry.  
1. Defense Spending of Turkey 
As mentioned in Chapter III, Turkey’s defense spending is not very transparent. 
This is not only because of security reasons, but also because of the complexity of 
financial resources of defense spending. “MND budget is supplemented by the budgets 
for the Gendarmerie, Coast Guard and Undersecretariat for Turkish Defense Industries 
(SSM). MND spending accounts for around 70 per cent of the total budget, the 
Gendarmerie around 17 per cent and SSM procurement 10 to 12 per cent.”97  
Until the year 2000, Turkey’s defense spending had an increasing trend, while the 
world at large had a decreasing trend, and 2000 was the peak year for defense spending, 
both as a dollar amount and as a percent of the GDP. After that time, Turkey’s defense 
spending started decreasing. The biggest reason for this decrease was large budget cuts 
after the 2001 economic crisis. This crisis showed its effects mostly on the discretionary 
part of the Turkish budget, especially the defense budget. Another reason for this 
decrease is standby agreements with IMF. “Turkey pledged to the IMF in late December, 
2000 that it would cut the military budget, one of the main sources of inflationary 
                                                 
97 Jane's Defense, “Budgets – Turkey”, July 4, 2008. 
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pressures exerted upon the country's economy.” The years between 2002 and 2005 were 
recovery years for both the Turkish economy and defense spending, and 2006 was the 
beginning of a new increasing trend.98  
Comparing the following two charts shows that defense spending followed a 
similar path, with its share in the gross domestic product until 2008. In 2008, although the 
share of defense spending of the gross domestic product has a decreasing trend, defense 
spending has an increasing trend, which means that economic growth and the gross 
domestic product increase is greater than the increase in defense spending. 
The following chart reflects Turkey’s defense spending over a 20-year period. 










































Figure 7.   Defense Spending of Turkey 1988-200899 
 
                                                 
98 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey Spends More on Defense”, Today’s Zaman, January 16, 2009. 
99 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”. 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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The following chart reflects Turkey’s defense spending as a percent of the GDP.  
 










































Figure 8.   Defense Spending as a Percentage of the GDP 1988-
2008100 
2. The Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers  
Defense industry sales, exports, and R&D money are the main variables to 
analyze to measure the development of a defense industry. Turkish defense industry 
sales, beginning in 1997, had a decreasing trend until 2001, but after 2001, they started 
increasing and followed an increasing path with only slight deviations. In 1997, defense 
industry sales were $1.205 billion and in 2007, they reached $2.011 billion, with an 
increasing rate of 66% over 10 years. Comparing these numbers with the current status of 
developed countries such as the UK, Germany, and France, it is apparent that with this 
trend, it is almost impossible to catch these countries, from an industry power 
perspective. The sales of the United Kingdom’s defense industry were $42.4 billion in 
2008; French defense industry sales were $42.1 billion; and German defense industry 
sales were $27.6 billion.101 Comparing Turkish defense industry sales with Israel, a 
second-tier country that started establishing domestic defense industry efforts around the 
                                                 
100 SIPRI YEARBOOK 2008, “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.” 
http://yearbook2008.sipri.org/files/SIPRIYB08summary.pdf (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
101 Data monitor, “Aerospace & Defense in Germany”, December 2008.  
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same time as Turkey, it is apparent that even in 2015, with this trend, Turkey will not be 
able to reach the industry sales level of Israel. Israel's defense industry turnover was 
about $7 billion in 2008.102 The following figure shows sales, exports, and money 
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Figure 9.   The Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers 1997-
2007104 
3. The Relationship Between Defense Spending and the Defense 
Industry 
In this part of the thesis, it is assumed that Turkey’s defense spending will affect 
Turkish defense industry sales. Subsequent data from 1997-2007 was collected from the 
SASAD (Savunma Sanayi Imalatcilar Dernegi – Defense Industry Manufacturers 
Association) database (inflation adjusted) and analyzed to determine if any relationship 
exists between military expenditure and defense industry sales.  
 
                                                 
102 Epicos, Industry and Defense Portal, “A discussion with Joseph Ackerman, President and CEO of 
Elbit Systems, Israel's largest defense company,” November 18, 2008.  
103 M.Kaya Yazgan, “Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers,” May 2008, 3. www.sasad.org 
(Accessed December 23, 2008). 
104 M.Kaya Yazgan, “Turkish Defense Industry with Numbers,” May 2008, 3. www.sasad.org 
(Accessed December 23, 2008). 
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In order to determine the relationship, if any, between these two variables, 
covariance and the coefficient of correlation were calculated. Covariance was calculated 
as -0.6694. Coefficient calculations showed that they were moving in the opposite 
direction. The advantage of coefficient correlation over covariance is having upper and 
lower limits (-1 and +1), and nearness to these limits shows the strength of the 
relationship. Coefficient correlation, which was - 0.8258, showed that there was a strong 
negative relationship between defense spending and industry sales. The following chart 
shows this negative relationship between these two variables.   
 






















Figure 10.   Defense Spending vs. Industry Sales 
 
After finding out that there was a negative linear relationship between these two 
variables, a linear regression model was developed, based on the following: military 
expenditure was the independent variable and industry sales was the dependent variable. 
The objective of this model was to determine, based on historical data, how military 
expenditure has affected defense industry sales.  
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The output generated from this regression model is displayed in the following 
table. The least squares method was used to calculate the strength of this relationship. 
The least squares line is: 
Industry sales = 3.15222- 0.1424 Military expenditure 
Also, the following output represents this equation. 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept 3.152222777 0.433615072 7.269633783 4.7157E-05
Military Expenditure -0.142415056 0.032419405 -4.392895411 0.00173822
Table 6.   Regression Analysis 
 
In this equation, the intercept is 3.152, meaning that if we extend the least squares 
line to 0, it would intersect the y-axis at 3.152. The slope of this line measures the 
marginal rate of change in the dependent variable. The slope is -0.1424, which means that 
for each unit increase in military expenditure, the marginal decrease in defense industry 
sales was 0.1424. 
The following is the Excel output for regression analysis. The model can be 
assessed in three ways: standard error of estimate, the coefficient of determination, and 
the F test of the analysis of variance. The output shows that 68% of the variability 
(coefficient of determination- R square) in defense industry sales can be explained by 
defense spending. Standard error (0.2215) is judged according to the magnitude of the 
dependent variable. In this case, it is particularly small compared to the dependent 
variable (industry sales). The adjusted R square is calculated to avoid creating a false 
impression of a small sample size. In this model, the adjusted R square is 0.6466, 
indicating that however the coefficient of determination is measured, the model’s fit is 











Table 7.   Regression Statistics 
The following is the Excel output for the anova table. In this table, a large value 
of F (19.297) indicates that most of the variation in industry sales is explained by the 
regression equation and the model is valid. Furthermore, the SSR (0.9469) is very large 
compared to the SSE (0.049), which signifies a good model.105 
 
ANOVA           
  Df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 1 0.946968565 0.946968565 19.2975301 0.001738223
Residual 9 0.441648078 0.049072009     
Total 10 1.388616644       
Table 8.   Anova Table 
Statistical analysis shows that there is a strong negative relationship between 
military expenditure of Turkey and their defense industry sales. The model found based 
on this analysis is: defense industry sales = 3.15222- 0.1424 military expenditure; 
meaning that each unit increase in military expenditure results with a 0.1424-unit 
decrease in defense industry sales. Although this statistical analysis shows a negative 
relationship, from a logical perspective, it is hard to sustain this relationship. How can 
industry sales increase while defense spending decreases? And what are the reasons for 
this negative relationship?  
                                                 
105 Gerald Keller, Statistics for Management and Economics (Thomson South- Western Publications 
2005), 200-380. 
Regression Statistics   
Multiple R 0.82580327
R Square 0.681951041




Assuming that everything is constant other than defense spending and industry 
sales, the relationship should be positive, because the defense market is a monopsony 
(many sellers but only one buyer). There is only one buyer and this buyer’s spending 
should affect industry sales positively. Personnel expenditure of Turkey followed a 
decreasing trend until 2002 and followed a stable trend from then until 2007.106 
Operation and maintenance and procurement trends followed an increasing trend until 
2007.107 Based on these findings, this negative relationship can be explained by two 
reasons; the first is an increasing trend in exports, and the second is increasing trends in 
domestic purchases.  
According to findings, increasing trends in defense industry exports is one factor 
that causes this negative relationship. The following table shows defense industry exports 
from 1997 to 2007. Data shows that industry exports had an increasing trend and the 
deviations from this trend were experienced in years: 1998, 1999, and 2004. The average 
export growth rate is 20%, compared to the industry sales average growth rate of 6%. 




(b$) 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.33 0.20 0.34 0.35 0.42 0.24 
Growth 
(%)   -0.43 0.00 0.54 0.06 0.92 0.32 -0.41 0.73 0.03 0.20 0.20 
Table 9.   Defense Industry Exports 
Increasing trends in the domestic contribution rate or meeting defense needs from 
domestic companies is another reason for the previously described negative relationship. 
There is only limited data about this, starting from 2005. In 2005, the percentage of 
Turkish Armed Forces purchases from domestic companies was 25%; in 2006, it was 
36.7%; and in 2007, it was calculated as 41.6%. The objective in 2010 is 50%.108  Based 
 
                                                 
106 SIPRI, “NATO Military Expenditure on Personnel and Equipment, 1998–2007” SIPRI Yearbook 
2008, appendix 5B. 
107 Jane's Defense, “Budgets – Turkey,” July 4, 2008. 
108 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, Official Website, “Activity Report 2007.” 
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/TR/dokumantasyon/Documents/2007%20Yılı%20Faaliyet%20Raporu1.pdf 
(Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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on these findings, in spite of limited data, we can say that the domestic contribution rate 
in Turkey’s defense spending is increasing, and this is another reason for the negative 
relationship between industry sales and defense spending.  
Increasing the domestic contribution rate to develop an independent defense 
industry is the primary aim of Turkey’s defense systems acquisition policy. Although the 
domestic contribution rate has an increasing trend, and the 2010 objective is achievable 
according to trend analysis, comparing these numbers with other countries shows that 
special emphasis is needed to reach the level of developed countries and achieve the 
primary objective of this policy. However, comparing numbers with other countries also 
shows that today’s domestic contribution rate and the target rate in 2010 are both far 
behind the countries that have developed a domestic defense infrastructure. The domestic 
contribution rate in the U.S is 95%; in France, 90%; in Germany, 80%; in the United 
Kingdom, 85%; and in Israel, 79%.109 
C.  FINANCIAL VARIABLES OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
In this part of the thesis, policy effects on the defense industry are analyzed 
according to the following variables: industry exports, offset applications, the money 
allocated for R&D, and current acquisition programs.  
1. Defense Industry Exports  
Exports have special meaning for defense industries because domestic defense 
markets are too small to support a specialized production line. Limited domestic demand 
is not sufficient to maintain a production line forever. Also, it is not easy to establish a 
production line, and it requires huge investment and R&D. After producing the required 
number of tanks, a state cannot close a tank plant just because it will not need it anymore. 
Export is the only way to maintain production. 
 
                                                 
109 Goknur Pilli, “SSM Presentation” (Paper presented at Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 
Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements Conference, Ankara, Turkey, May 24 2007). 
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Another important point about exports is that they not only provide profit to a 
company, but they also help spread out the overhead burden of a production line, and 
economies of scale can be achieved only by producing more.110 Exports decrease the cost 
of a defense system by spreading out the overhead over an increased amount of 
production.   
Despite including some political issues, allied countries may be preferred for 
importing defense systems, exports can be used to measure product quality, especially for 
major systems acquisitions. Major arms procurements are made for the long term, and in 
many cases, quality of the product is major evaluation criteria for the state. States do not 
want to spend a huge amount of money on useless systems, and exports around the world 
can show which systems are preferred by countries. 
According to SIPRI data, Turkey was the 3rd largest recipient of major 
conventional weapons for the period 1998–2003, and the 9th largest for the period 2003-
2007. It is clear that, when looking at its export rank, it does not occupy any of the 
highest positions. Turkey was, in fact, the 28th largest exporter for the period 2000-2004, 
and the 21st largest for the period 2006-2007. The following table shows the largest 
weapon exporters for the period 2006-2007.111  
SIPRI in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices. 
Rank Country 2006 2007 Total 
1 USA 7821 7454 15275 
2 Russia 6463 4588 11051 
3 Germany (FRG) 2891 3395 6286 
4 France 1586 2690 4276 
5 Netherlands 1575 1355 2930 
6 UK 978 1151 2128 
7 Spain 825 529 1354 
8 Italy 694 562 1257 
9 China 562 355 917 
10 Sweden 437 413 850 
21 Turkey 56 33 89 
Table 10.   Largest Weapon Exporters 2006-2007 
                                                 
110 Richard A.Bitzinger, Towards a Brave New Arms Industry (Oxford University Press 2003), 83. 
111 SIPRI, http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/at_db.html (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
 66
From the perspective of arms exports, these numbers and ranks show that Turkey 
is closing the gap every year and increasing its arms exports and arms export share in the 
world with an increasing rate of 14.7%. The years 2005 and 2006 were the brightest years 
for arms export, and in 2005, arms exports increased 155%. According to SIPRI data, 
1997 was the worst year for Turkey’s arms exports with nearly “0”, meaning that arms 
exports had negligible values. 








42.9% 0.0% 53.8% 5.7% 92.3% 32.4% - 40.8% 73.5% 2.9% 20.0% 19.7% 
Arms  
(b$) 0 0.03 0.035 0.015 0.02 0.023 0.038 0.02 0.051 0.056 0.033 0.03 
Growth 
(%)   16.7% 
-
57.1% 33.3% 15.0% 65.2% 
-
47.4% 155.0% 9.8% 
-
41.1% -2.7% 14.7% 
Arms 
share 0 37.5% 43.8% 12.2% 15.4% 9.2% 11.5% 10.2% 15.0% 16.0% 7.9% 17.9% 
Table 11.   Arms Share in Exports112 
Arms exports of the Turkish defense industry are given to provide an insight 
about Turkey’s relative position and development from the arms trade perspective. Arms 
exports constitute nearly 18% of defense industry exports. However, in 1998, it 
constituted 37.5%, and in 1999, it constituted 43.8%. In subsequent years, its share did 
not reach these amounts again, and instead followed a path between 8 and 16% of 
industry exports.  
As mentioned before, Turkey’s defense industry exports have an increasing trend, 
with 20% as the average and the biggest export increase was in 2005 with a 75% 
increase. Industry exports have a 19.7% average growth rate. Excluding years 1999 and 
 
 
                                                 
112 My calculations are based on SIPRI and SASAD data. 
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2004, they have followed an increasing trend. Industry exports dropped 42.9% in 1998 
and 40.8% in 2005. Between the years 1997 and 2007, defense industry exports growth 
rate is 200%.  
From the global aerospace and defense industry perspective, Turkey’s position is 
nearly the same as in the arms trade. According to 2007 data, it ranks as the twenty-fifth 
biggest exporter and fourteenth biggest importer in the world. Turkey’s export share of 
world defense trade is 0.18%, and their import share is 1.84%. The growth rate between 
2002 and 2007 (5 years) is 306%. In $246.700 million aerospace and defense industry 
market, the biggest exporter is the U.S., with a share of 39.55%, followed by France, with 
a share of 24.83%.   
Rank Country 
Trade Value 
(exports-.Th. $) Share (%) Growth (5 yr.) 
1 United States 97,560,397 39.55 48.89 
2 France 61,252,502 24.83 74.15 
3 Germany 18,413,284 7.46 62.22 
4 United Kingdom 17,068,322 6.92 47.43 
5 Canada 16,869,831 6.84 13.5 
25 Turkey 446,782 0.18 306.38 
Michigan State University 03/2007 
Table 12.   Aerospace and Defense Industry Exports113 
Comparing industry exports with imports shows that there is a huge gap between 
the two. However, this gap and Turkey’s imports position relative to other countries is 
changing every year; in 2005, Turkey ranked as the 3rd biggest importer; in 2006, it 
ranked as the 11th; and in 2007, it ranked as the 14th biggest importer. The following 
table reflects the biggest 5 importers and Turkey’s relative position. 
                                                 
113 Global Edge Industry Statistics, Official Website. 
https://globaledge.msu.edu/industries/tradestats.asp?industryID=42&ID=Exporting&SortBy=&View=&sec
tor=-1(Accessed February 10, 2009). 
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Rank Country Trade Value (imports-Th..$) Share (%) Growth (5 yr.) 
1 France 38,413,426 13.17 43.06 
2  United States 36,296,411 12.44 -12.11 
3  China 24,479,372 8.39 162.11 
4  United Kingdom 16,010,757 5.49 12.48 
5  Germany 15,775,745 5.41 45.51 
14  Turkey 5,352,753 1.84 133.31 
Table 13.   Aerospace and Defense Industry Imports114 
The gap between imports and exports is not only damaging Turkey’s economy, 
but also it is damaging their defense industry. The money that could be spent on the 
defense industry is going abroad without adding any value to the domestic defense 
industry.   
Export structure is another important point that must be considered. Looking at 
the export structure of the defense industry shows that it is dominated by electronic 
products and biggest companies in the Turkish defense industry are working in the 
electronics field. It is not a coincidence, because electronics is a field that requires less 
investment compared with weapon systems and can be used for commercial purposes. 
The following figure shows the current exports of the Turkish defense industry. 
                                                 
114 Global Edge Industry Statistics, Official Website. 
https://globaledge.msu.edu/industries/tradestats.asp?industryID=42&ID=Exporting&SortBy=&View=&sec
tor=-1(Accessed February 10, 2009). 
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COMPANIES ORIGINAL DESIGN EXPORTS POTENTIAL EXPORTS 
Pedestal Mounted Stinger Low Altitude Air Defense system Holland   ASELSAN   
9600 Frequency Hopping 
Radio 
Compliant with 
International Standards  Pakistan   
ROKETSAN 122 mm Multi-Launch Rocket System 
Best in Class  
Long Range  
High Precision 
UAE Malaysia  S. Arabia 






ONUK Coast Guard Craft 
Advanced Composite  








Pilot Simulator Advanced Pilot Training  S. Korea   
HAVELSAN Electronic Warfare Test and 
Training Range (EWTTR) 
Advanced Test and 
Simulation Environment  
High Technology 
Command and Control 
 Pakistan  S. Korea 
OTOKAR  Cobra 
Compliant with 






Figure 11.   Defense Industry Exports (By Product)115 
Another important point that must be considered about the above figure is the 
number of countries that import defense systems from Turkey. There are nearly 180 
countries in the world, and only ten countries are currently importing Turkey’s defense 
systems. This number shows that Turkey’s defense industry has not been successful in 
exploiting the benefits of a huge defense market and has only been able to introduce its 
products to a handful of countries. The SSM is organizing defense industry products 
introduction meetings. However, as seen in the previous figure, they have not been 
effective enough to reach many countries. Two things must be considered to determine 
the reasons underlying this problem. The first one is product quality and the second is 
 
 
                                                 
115 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, Official Website, “Defense Industry Exports.” 
http://www.ssm.gov.tr/EN/savunmasanayiimiz/ihracurunleri/Pages/default.aspx (Accessed December 12, 
2008). 
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political impact. Product quality is out of the scope of this thesis, but from the political 
perspective, it can be said that political impacts on industry exports are not enough to 
boost exports.  
The other point that must be considered about this table is that, although 
Turkey has been fighting with terrorists for more than two decades, only a couple of 
products are produced and exported that can be used against terrorist attacks. Many 
countries around the world are faced with similar threats. If the Turkish defense industry 
focused on the existing threat and used the experiences gained by the Turkish Armed 
Forces up until now, many dollars would not be spent for acquiring the required 
equipment from abroad, and it would also be a good opportunity for industry exports.   
The Turkish defense industry needs political impacts in the international arena 
to introduce its products and increase the level of exports. France may be a good model 
for Turkey. As mentioned earlier, political support plays an important role in France’s 
defense exports and ministers take defense industry representatives with them on their 
visits to foreign countries. More than $61 billion in exports shows French success in this 
arena. Turkish ministers’ emphasis on defense industry products and their introduction 
may boost exports. Political support is also needed for introducing defense industry 
products to former USSR republics. Although Turkey has good relationships and national 
ties with most of them, such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and 
Kirgizstan, none of these countries are importing any defense products from Turkey. This 
can be explained by continued Russian dominance and impacts on these countries, but 
national ties and political assistance can open these markets to Turkey’s defense industry 
products. 
Using defense industry representatives in foreign countries can be another 
way to increase the export level of the Turkish defense industry; these representatives can 






technological developments in the countries in which they reside. Countries such as 
France, Singapore, and Israel are using these kinds of representatives efficiently to carry 
out export activities and to follow technological improvements.116 
2. Offset Applications 
Using offsets in procurements can help any government to achieve multiple 
objectives. These objectives can be: “acquiring new technology and capabilities, 
supporting key industries, gaining access to new markets, generating export earnings, and 
forming strategic alliances with established multinational enterprises.”117  
Turkey has been applying offsets since 1985 to create a domestic defense industry 
and not to be dependent on foreign suppliers for defense needs. Since the establishment 
of the SSM, 63 offset agreements have been signed. 20 out of 63 offset programs were 
successfully completed, and 43 offset programs are still effective. The total offset 
commitment was $6.1 billion and $3.3 billion of these commitments have been fullfilled. 
The following table shows the categories of these offset applications. 
 
OFFSET CATEGORY AMOUNT (US $ M) % 
Defense Goods and Services Exports 1.154 35 
Export of Industrial Goods and Services 1.076 32 
R&D, Tech. Coop., Investment, Others 733 22 
Services for Turkish Armed Forces 375 11 
T     O    T    A     L 3.338 100 




                                                 
116 Turkish Defense Industry Special Commission report, “Ninth Development Plan,” 2007.  
www.dpt.gov.tr/DocObjects/Download/3272/oik699.pdf (Accessed December 16, 2008), 83. 
117 Claire Taylor, “Using Procurement Offsets as an Economic Development Strategy,” Library House 
of Commons, Research Paper 2004, 31. 
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Figure 13.   Remaining Offset Commitments by Year118 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce report between the years 1993 
and 1999, Turkey had 4 agreements valued at $158 million and the offset share was 
$145.3 million, which constituted 91% of import agreements.119 Between the years 1993 
and 2005, Turkey had 18 offset agreements valued at $1.255 billion, and the import value 
of these contracts was $2.695 billion. The offset share constituted 46.6% of imports. 
During this period, France’s offset share in imports was 84.6%, the UK’s offset share was 
83.9%, Germany’s share was 100%, and European countries’ total offset share in imports 
was 98.8%. In most of the European countries, the offset requirement is 100%, but in 
Turkey, the offset share of imports is determined as 50% by new policy.120  
                                                 
118 Goknur Pilli, “SSM Presentation” (Paper presented at Undersecretariat for Defense 
Industries,,Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements Conference, Ankara, Turkey, May 24 2007). 
119 US Department of Commerce/BIS offset database, 2003, Adapted from “Offset policies and trends 
in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan,” Michael W. Chinworth, 2003.  
120 U.S. Department of Commerce/BIS offset database, “Offsets in Defense Trade Eleventh report to 
Congress.” Jan 2007. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IAJ/is_3_29/ai_n19448297/pg_15 (Accessed 
December 18, 2008). 
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Offset commitments made by foreign contractors have special meaning for 
Turkish defense industry companies. They rely heavily on offsets to maintain their 
production lines, and to be competitive by creating economies of scale.121 With the help 
of offsets, defense industry companies gained the opportunity to have long-term strategic 
partnerships with foreign firms having offset obligations in Turkey, and they gained the 
opportunity to participate in international markets.  
Comparing European countries’ offset share in exports with Turkey’s offset share 
shows that Turkey was not able to use the benefits of offsets as well as European 
countries. Turkey’s high reliance on foreign suppliers indicates that offset applications 
were not as successful as they were intended be in creating a sound defense industry 
capability and could not achieve the objective of reducing the dependence on foreign 
suppliers. However, it still played a dominant role in industry exports; 70% of major 
defense industry company exports come from offset applications.122  
3. Research and Development 
The amount spent on defense R&D is a valuable source for analyzing the 
importance of defense industry for a country; it shows the priority of defense industry 
among other industries. The money spent on R&D is the only method to develop a 
technology base and improve the capability of a defense industry. It also helps to increase 
the quality, rather than the quantity, of the arms.123 In addition to having such pros, 
R&D includes serious risks and tradeoffs. Although investing in R&D is the only way to 
have a domestic or national industrial base, the money spent on R&D does not 
necessarily mean gaining the desired results. It being so important and involving such 
risks forces every state to think twice and make serious tradeoffs about allocating money 
for R&D. Another tradeoff about R&D includes time concerns, balancing today’s urgent 
                                                 
121 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “New Offset Policy to Boost Turkish Defense Exports,” Today’s zaman, 
May 28, 2007.   
122 Murat Bayar, “SSM Presentation” (Paper presented at Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 
Offsets in Turkish Defense Procurements Conference, Ankara, Turkey, May 24 2007). 
123 Keith Hartley, “Defence R&D: Data Issues”, Defense and Peace Economics,Vol. 17(3), December 
2005, 169–175.  
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needs with tomorrow’s concerns. It requires patience; the desired results on a project may 
be obtained in a few years or may take decades. In the end, it may be too late, or 
requirements or desired results may change.  
R&D spending can be divided into two categories: government spending and 
industry spending. Industry companies are not as eager to spend on R&D, mostly because 
of two things: they cannot earn high profits from the systems developed by their own 
R&D money, because governments impose profit limits, and also, governments want to 
control the characteristics of a weapon system, and they don’t want to procure systems 
imposed by the companies.124 In some cases, the risk associated with research and 
development prevents defense firms from spending their money on R&D instead of new 
investments. For these reasons, the government’s emphasis on R&D activities gains high 
importance for defense industries. 
Turkey has faced tradeoffs between present and future interests several times 
during the last decade. Because of threat assessments and fighting with terrorists, 
government officials considered every need as urgent and in need of being procured as 
soon as possible. The reality of this consideration is open to debate. But it is indisputable 
that these assessments were the biggest burden for structuring a domestic defense 
industry and were the primary reason for negligence of R&D.  
Looking at the countries with high domestic contribution rates shows that their 
success is not a coincidence. They spend a lot of money on R&D. According to the 
Department of Defense Budget report, the U.S.’s defense R&D spending was $72 billion 
in 2006, $75 billion in 2007, and $75 billion in 2008; nearly 13-15% of the defense 
budget was spent on R&D.125 In 2008, total R&D spending from the federal budget was 
$148 billion, and $68.1 billion was spent just for weapon systems R&D.126 The statistics 
are more or less the same in Europe. They spend 2-3% of their Gross National Product 
                                                 
124 Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz, Implementing Military Innovation (Colombia University 
Press 2006), 21. 
125 U.S. Department of Defense, “Defense Budget.” 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy08/pdf/budget/defense.pdf (Accessed December 18, 2008). 
126 American Association for the Advancement of Science, “AAAS Preliminary Analysis of R&D in 
the FY 2008 Budget.” http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/prel08p.htm (Accessed December 28, 2008). 
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(GNP) on R&D. 127 Comparing these numbers with Turkey’s R&D spending, which was 
0.67% in 2002, including private and public R&D expenditure, and $3.830 billion with 
0.76% of GNP in 2005, shows that from the R&D perspective, R&D activities were not 
as supported by the Turkish government as in the U.S. and Europe. Although the goal of 
raising GNP spending on R&D to 2% by 2010 may boost the R&D spending level to 
European countries, according to SSM statistics, since 1985, around $2 billion out of 
about $14 billion spent by the SSM in the past 20 years for procurement projects has 
gone abroad to foreign companies for R&D on Turkish projects, and only 0.3% of the 
SSM's funding has been earmarked for domestic R&D since its establishment in 1985. 128  
As mentioned earlier, defense companies are reluctant to spend their own money 
for R&D. European companies spent 6.6% of their turnover on R&D in 2001 and 20% in 
2006; however, American companies spend only 3.2% of their sales on R&D and other 
R&D money comes from government assistance.129 For the Turkish defense industry, the 
R&D share of industry turnover was 4.5% on average.130 This percentage is higher than 
the U.S. defense industry company R&D share in their turnover; however, it is behind the 
R&D share of European defense industry companies in their turnover. For example, 
Finmeccanica, one of the Top 10 defense contractors in the world, spent 16.4% of its 
sales on R&D. The following figure shows the R&D share in Turkish defense companies’ 





                                                 
127 Murad Bayar, Undersecretary of Defense Industries (SSM), “A Globus Vision Exclusive 
Interview”, Capital Magazine June, 2008. 
128 Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Turkey Makes Defense R&D Spending Priority,” Jane's Defense Weekly  
November 24, 2004. 
129 Vlachos and Dengler, Off Track? The Future of the European Defense Industry, International 
Defense Research Institute, RAND Publications 2004, 80. 
130 My calculations based on SASAD data. 
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Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
R&D (b$) 0.034 0.048 0.042 0.043 0.024 0.049 0.058 0.064 0.079 0.09 0.12
Turnover 
(b$) 1.205 0.968 1.075 0.852 0.849 1.062 1.301 1.337 1.591 1.72 2.011
R&D 
share (%) 2.8% 4.9% 3.9% 5.0% 2.9% 4.6% 4.5% 4.8% 4.9% 5.2% 6.0%
Average R&D Share Between 1997- 2007 = 4.5% 
Table 14.   R&D and Defense Industry Sales131  
After the economic crisis in 2001, R&D share in company turnovers followed an 
increasing path, and in 2007, they spent 6% (industry average) of their turnover on R&D. 
Only two firms, ASELSAN and ROKETSAN, are spending 10% of their turnover on 
R&D.  
The magnitude of the money allocated for R&D is another point that must be 
considered. In 1997, the money spent for R&D was nearly $34 million and in 2007, it 
became $120 million. Although the increase in these 10 years is 252%, the amount spent 
is not so much compared to other countries. The largest amount spent on R&D, by entire 
defense industry companies, was $120 million in 2007. The amount spent on R&D by 
most of the European companies was much higher than this amount. For example, in 
2007, EADS spent £1.983 million ($2.830 million) on R&D, which was nearly 24 times 
more than the Turkish defense industry, and Finmeccanica spent £1436 million ($2049 
million) on R&D, which was 12 times more than the Turkish defense industry.132   
a. The Relationship Between R&D and Industry Sales 
The relationship between R&D and industry sales is an important variable 
for measuring the effects of R&D on industry sales. Regression analysis was conducted 
to explore this relationship. R&D was considered the independent variable and industry 
sales was the dependent variable. According to regression analysis results, the coefficient 
 
                                                 
131 My calculations based on SASAD data. 
132 Department for Innovations, Universities & Skills (UK), Official Website 
http://www.innovation.gov.uk/rd_scoreboard/?p=40 (Accessed December 22, 2008). 
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correlation was calculated as 0.9427, meaning that there is a strong positive relationship 
between R&D and industry sales. The least squares method was used to calculate the 
strength of this relation. The least squares line is: 
Industry sales = 0.521 + 12.667 R&D  
The slope of this line measures the marginal rate of change in the 
dependent variable. The slope is 12.667, which means that, for each unit increase in 
R&D, the marginal increase in defense industry sales was 12.667 units. The output 
showed that 88% of the variability (coefficient of determination- R square) in defense 
industry sales can be explained by R&D. Standard error (0.13) is judged according to the 
magnitude of the dependent variable. In this case, it is particularly small compared to the 
dependent variable (industry sales). Adjusted R square was calculated to avoid creating a 
false impression of a small sample size. In this model, Adjusted R square is 0.88, 
indicating that no matter how the coefficient of determination is measured, the model’s fit 
is good. Statistical analysis showed that there is a strong positive relationship between 
R&D and defense industry sales.  
b. The Relationship between R&D and Industry Exports 
The relationship between R&D and industry export is another important 
variable to measure the R&D effects on exports. Regression analysis was conducted to 
explore this relationship. R&D was considered to be the independent variable and 
industry exports was considered the dependent variable. According to regression analysis 
results, the coefficient correlation was calculated as 0.852, meaning that there is a strong 
positive relationship between R&D and industry sales. The least squares method was 
used to calculate the strength of this relationship. The least squares line is: 
Industry exports = 0.0021 + 3.7162 R&D   
The slope of this line measures the marginal rate of change in the 
dependent variable. The slope is 3.7162, meaning that, for each unit increase in R&D, the 
marginal increase in defense industry sales will be 3.7162 units. The regression analysis 
output showed that 0.727% of the variability (coefficient of determination- R square) in 
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defense industry sales can be explained by R&D. Standard error (0.066) is judged 
according to the magnitude of the dependent variable. In this case, it is particularly small 
compared to the dependent variable (industry exports). Adjusted R square is calculated to 
avoid creating the false impression of a small sample size. In this model, adjusted R 
square is 0.70, indicating that however the coefficient of determination is measured, the 
model’s fit is good. Statistical analysis showed that there is a strong positive relationship 
between R&D and defense industry exports. 
4. Analysis of Current Program Structures 
The Turkish defense industry development model has followed a path similar to 
many second-tier countries, beginning with imported arms and continuing with limited 
original designs. Three different approaches shaped Turkey’s defense systems acquisition 
policy in the past. The first one was direct procurement, before 1990; joint developments 
and consortiums, between 1990 and 2000; and original design, after 2000. After 2000, 
priority was given to original design and industry development efforts focused on this 
approach.133  
The current status of major acquisition programs and how they are carried out are 
important variables to depict the current status of the Turkish defense industry and its 
industry development efforts so far. They show the domestic defense industry capability 
and the extent of the need for foreign suppliers to fulfill defense needs.  
According to the SSM 2007 activity report, 107 acquisition programs are carried 
out by SSM and in 74 of the programs, they reached the agreement that valued $17.38 
billion (24.341 billion TL).134 The acquisition of these programs is divided into four 
categories: domestic development, consortiums, joint production, and direct 
procurements from foreign suppliers.  
                                                 
133 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Officil Website, “Activity report 2007”, 34. 
www.ssm.gov.tr (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
134 $1 is calculated as 1.4TL. 
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Domestic production is defined as the acquisition programs that are developed by 
a main domestic contractor, and where intellectual and industrial property rights belong 
to Turkey.   
Consortium is defined as the acquisition programs that result from harmonized 
military requirements, where system development activities are conducted by job-sharing 
partners or through a consortium of companies. 
Joint production is defined as any system where intellectual and property rights 
belong to a foreign country, and therefore, domestic production is limited. 
Direct procurement is defined as the acquisition programs that industry 
participation is limited to offsets.135   
According to 2007 data, from the perspective of the number of programs, 2 
programs (nearly 2% of the total number) are being conducted by consortiums; 17 
programs (16%) are being procured directly from foreign suppliers, and industry 
participation is limited with offsets; 62 programs (58%) are being developed 
domestically; 26 programs (24%) are being conducted in joint production. The following 
figure reflects this distribution.  











Figure 14.   Acquisition Programs – Numbers 
                                                 
135 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Official website, “Activity report 2007”, 60. 
www.ssm.gov.tr (Accessed December 20, 2008). 
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From the value perspective: the value of the programs conducted by consortiums 
is $1.91 billion (11%); the value of the programs that are being procured directly from 
foreign suppliers, where industry participation is limited with offsets, is $1.39 billion 
(8%); the value of the programs that are being developed domestically is $3.82 billion 
(22%); and the value of the programs that are being conducted in joint production is 
$10.25 billion (59 %). The following figure reflects this distribution.  
 










Figure 15.   Acquisition Programs – Value 
These numbers show that the share of domestically developed programs, from the 
perspective of the number of programs,, is the biggest share; but this is not true from the 
value perspective. The programs that are being developed by domestic companies worth 
only 22% of what is being spent on defense acquisition programs. Joint production has 
the biggest value, at 59%. Turkey is highly dependent on foreign suppliers for acquiring 
defense systems from the value perspective, because all other acquisition approaches 
include foreign company participation. But the good point of this current status is, every 
approach is adding value to the Turkish defense industry, including direct procurement 
limited with offsets. Although the intellectual and industry rights belong to foreign firms 
in joint production, producing or assembling them inside the country is important for 
improving the capabilities of the defense industry, and for providing experience for future 
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applications. Consortium is another approach that adds value and improves the 
capabilities of the defense industry by sharing the job from the beginning to the end of a 
program.  
D.  CHALLENGES OF TURKEY’S DEFENSE SYSTEMS ACQUISITION 
POLICY 
1. Selected Acquisition Programs 
a. Altay Main Battle Tank Program 
The Altay Main Battle Tank Project will be the biggest challenge of the 
Turkish defense industry in the near future. What makes this program so special is that it 
is the first main battle tank that will be designed and produced by the Turkish defense 
industry by using existing industrial capabilities. All intellectual and ownership rights 
will belong to the Turkish government.  
When the program started in 1996, the first objective was to produce a 
tank under the license of an existing tank in the world. Because of the high costs, the 
program was cancelled in 2004, and it changed direction in 2005. The decision for a 
national main battle tank was given in 2005, after a feasibility study was completed. 
OTOKAR was chosen as the prime contractor in 2007. 
The objective is to produce 250 tanks for the Turkish Army, after 7 years 
of prototype production and testing. The estimated budget for design, prototype 
production, test, and evaluation is $500 million. ASELSAN will work as a subcontractor 
on subsystems such as the fire control system, C4SI Systems, and integration studies. 
Hyundai-Rotem (South Korea) is another subcontractor that will provide technical 
support and assistance and will supply more than 50% of the technology to develop the 
tanks. The other subcontractors are MKE and ROKETSAN, who will design, develop, 
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and produce gun systems and armor systems.136 The program includes technology 
transfer worth $330 million, and the production of 4 prototypes worth $70 million. Once 
development is complete, a second set of contracts will be signed.137 
It is obvious that this program, if it is completed as intended, will add 
many things to the defense industrial base and industry exports. Until the inception of this 
program, the tradeoff among resources delayed producing a main battle tank, and Turkey 
focused mostly on modernizing existing tanks, which has added almost no value to the 
defense industrial base until now. 
b. T- 129 Atak Helicopter Program 
The objective of this program is to meet the need of the Turkish Army for 
an attack and tactical reconnaissance helicopter. The important point in this program is 
that high-tech equipment, developed by national firms, will be integrated into procured 
helicopters. The program model that will be used is direct procurement with local 
integration. AgustaWestland, Eurocopter, Denel, and Rosoboronexport competed for the 
program and the government decided to continue negotiations with AgustaWestland. 
Tusas Aerospace Industries (TAI) was chosen as the prime local contractor.138  
The estimated value of this program to AgustaWestland is in excess of 1.2 
billion EURO, based on the requirement for 51 A-129 helicopters (about $1.6 billion). 
The program is expected to last for 114 months (9.5 years), and the 1st “T-129” (Turkish 
version) attack helicopter will be delivered to Turkey in June 2013. According to Turkish 




                                                 
136 Turkish Defense News, “Turkey's National Main Battle Tank Project (ALTAY) Started with the 
Ceremony Held at OTOKAR Factory,” September 19, 2008. 
137 Defense Industry Daily, “Turkey Signs Deal With S. Korea for Altay Tank Project,” August 3, 
2008.  
138 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Official Website, “Programs, Atak Helicopter,” 
www.ssm.gov.tr (Accessed December 25, 2008). 
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industrial benefits for Turkey. Several leading Turkish aerospace companies, such as TAI 
and ASELSAN, will be involved in the programme. Final assembly, delivery and 
acceptance of the aircraft will also take place in Turkey.”139  
Many problems were witnessed during the acquisition efforts of this new 
helicopter. Because of numerous snafus, technology transfer and production issues, and 
canceled competitions, all three invited American manufacturers had abandoned the 
competition entirely. But the Turkish government’s emphasis on technology transfer and 
on export right will add a new product that can be exported by the Turkish company TAI, 
and will add new expertise to the technology baseline. “TAI will be the sole source for 
the production of the whole fuselage, including final assembly and flight operations, and 
will be responsible for marketing the “T-129 attack helicopters” to the world.”140 And 
another good point about this situation is that ASELSAN will increase its skills in 
helicopter technology by using its own systems during the production phase. 
c. A400M Future Large Aircraft 
The objective of this program is to provide tactical transportation to the 
Turkish Armed Forces. Ten A400M transport aircraft will be procured using the 
consortium model and prime contractor is the AMSL (Airbus Military Sociedad 
Limitada). The contract was signed in 2003, and the program is still in existence. The 
final assembly line is planned to start in April 2007, and the first flight is scheduled for 
January 2008. The delivery of 10 A400M aircraft to Turkey will be completed between 
2009 and 2014. The delivery of 180 A400M aircrafts to participating nations will be 
completed in 2021.141  
The A400M is a military transport aircraft designed to meet the 
requirements of eight European air forces (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom) to replace their fleets of C-130 Hercules and C-
                                                 
139 Defense Daily, “Turkey Finally Lands Upgraded Attack Helicopters,” June 25, 2008. 
140 Defense Daily, “Turkey Finally Lands Upgraded Attack Helicopters,” June 25, 2008. 
141 Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM), Official Website, “Programs, A400M Future Large 
Aircraft,” www.ssm.gov.tr (Accessed December 25, 2008). 
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160 Transalls. Based on the number of aircrafts, Turkey’s participation share is 5.56%. 
TAI’s, the biggest Turkish aerospace company, job share on body production is 7.15% 
and system job share is 1.26%. 
The A400M project is expected to be the most important aviation project 
to add value to the Turkish defense industry aviation technology baseline. With this 
program, TAI will get the European Aviation Security Agency (EASA) approved design 
certificate and will participate in a program beginning from the design phase and will 
take part in all phases for the first time. The job share is not limited to TAI; other Turkish 
companies, such as TEI SELEX, ASELSAN, and HAVELSAN, will have job shares in 
this program as well.142 
d. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
The JSF Program, being the largest-ever defense acquisition program in 
history, was initiated by the U.S. Government to meet the new generation fighter aircraft 
requirements of the U.S. Services beyond 2010. The program scope consists of 
cooperative development, production, and sustainment of the F-35 aircraft within an 
international partnership. The program model to be used is a consortium, and the prime 
contractor is LM Aero Team (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and BAE Systems). 
The project scope is to produce 3,173 aircrafts. The U.S. is the major player in this 
program, and will acquire 2,443 aircrafts, followed by the UK with 138 aircrafts. Turkey 
is the third largest participant, with $175 million invested, and wants to acquire 100 
aircrafts at a cost of around $10 billion to replace the existing F-4 and F-16 aircrafts 
beyond 2012.143 SSM and TAF reps are regularly attending the production activities. 
SSM and Turkish industry representatives are working hard to increase the level of 
Turkish industrial participation.144 
                                                 
142 Turmus Teker, “Avrupa’da Ortak Savunma Sistemleri Tedariki -Occar Ornegi” (Thesis 
diss.Undersecretariat for Defense Industries 2006), 45.  
143 Jane's,  Sentinel Security Assessment, “Eastern Mediterranean,” January 12, 2009. 
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Working with global players will add serious skills to the Turkish defense 
industry. The biggest challenge about this program is increasing the job share of Turkish 
companies. “Lockheed Martin has so far identified $4.5 billion of potential work for 
Turkey within the JSF program and has promised to increase this to around $5 billion.”  
The Northman Group and TAI signed an intent agreement about the job share over the 20 
years that is worth $3 billion. With this agreement, TAI will become a second-source 
production center for a minimum of 400 center fuselage sections. The parts will be 
manufactured during the low rate initial production phase of the F-35. 145 
2. Global Financial Crisis and its Possible Impacts 
The global financial crisis is and may continue to be the most important challenge 
for both the state economies and defense industries. According to U.S. Spy Chief Dennis 
C. Blair’s report to Congress, based on threat assessment, economic turmoil and 
instability are the most urgent threats that the U.S., a major player in both the global 
economy and defense market, is facing today.146 It is evident that this turmoil and 
instability is affecting economies all over the world: “[s]tock markets are down more than 
40% from their recent highs. Investment banks have collapsed, rescue packages are 
drawn up involving more than a trillion U.S. dollars, and interest rates have been cut 
around the world.”147 And the real problem is that how long this crisis will take is still 
unknown. 
From the defense spending perspective, the U.S. Department of Defense is 
preparing budget cuts as a response to the decrease in national income, and several 
stimulus packages are being prepared by the government. Many countries are taking the 
same measures and preparing budget cuts in discretionary parts of their budgets, such as 
defense spending. According to some analysts, including Martin Feldstein, a professor at 
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Harvard, the logic should be the opposite; defense spending can be a great stimulus for 
the economy and can provide job opportunities in both defense industry companies and 
supporting industries.148     
From the defense companies’ perspective, for most of them, the year was not too 
bad. Due to their low debt rates and cash flows, they have not been as affected by the 
crisis as other industries. For example, according to an analysis conducted by Pierre Chao 
from Renaissance Strategic Advisors, a $5 billion debt rate and $20 billion cash flow 
protected U.S. defense industry companies from the serious effects of the financial crisis. 
Defense industry companies used their cash flow either for acquiring specialized 
companies in the defense market or buying companies from unrelated industries to 
expand their portfolio. But for companies that gain most or at least half of their revenues 
from commercial sales, like Boeing or General Dynamics, the year 2008 was very hard. 
They faced a serious share loss in stock markets. For example, Boeing lost half of its 
share value; General Dynamics, 38%; and the Northman Group lost 48% in share value, 
in 2008.149 
According to Turkish Government officials, Turkey will not feel the effects of 
financial crisis as much as the U.S. and most European countries. The primary reason for 
this determination is the serious efforts taken after the economic crisis in 2001 to 
strengthen the Turkish banking sector and economic structure. Because of this 
determination, acquisition officials have stuck to the 2007-2011 acquisition plan and no 
adjustments have been made on acquisition accounts. According to Murad Bayar, 
Defense Industries Undersecretary (SSM), the defense industry will overcome this 
financial crisis by developing domestic technology, creating new employment 
opportunities in defense companies, and by increasing exports.150 This may be a correct 
approach if applied persistently. Defense spending might be a great stimulus for creating 
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new employment opportunities, and exports may be increased during this financial crisis 
with the help of the increasing value of the dollar and 70% offset structure of defense 
industry exports. However, the biggest problem for the Turkish government might also be 
the increasing dollar value against Turkish liras, which will increase the cost of imported 
defense systems. When the plan for acquisition of defense systems was implemented, 1 
dollar was between 1.2-1.3 Turkish liras. But according to the currency exchange rate of 
February 2009, 1 dollar now equals 1.65 Turkish liras, which means that the price of 
imported weapon systems has already increased nearly 30%. Considering the huge gap 
between industry exports and Turkey’s imports from foreign suppliers, the future does 
not seem so bright from the defense systems perspective. If the value of the dollar 
continues to increase against the Turkish lira, serious adjustments will have to be made 
on procurement accounts. It is obvious that these adjustments will primarily affect 
Turkish defense industry companies and their working partners. Limited amounts of 
exports and 70% offset share on exports may not help them as expected. Serious 
measures to overcome these problems must be considered by acquisition officials instead 
of maintaining the present course. 
3. Mergers and Acquisitions 
Company mergers and acquisitions are the other challenge for defense industries. 
As mentioned in earlier chapters, most of the defense companies all around the world are 
consolidating their powers with mergers and acquisitions to increase their competitive 
power and sustain their assembly lines. In most countries, a small number of companies 
are dominating the defense market. Turkish defense companies’ reactions to this trend are 
very important for the future of the Turkish defense industry.  
The merger and acquisition “wind,” despite narrowing demand in the defense 
market and the economic crisis in 2001, did not affect the Turkish defense industry in 
previous years, primarily because of three reasons. The first one is that 64% of Turkish 




foundations, and they are not as sensitive to the shareholders’ profit expectations. For this 
reason, they primarily focus on different commodity areas of the defense industry and 
their aim is to provide internal growth by specializing in these fields.151  
Lack of competitive power in the international defense market and being a 
developing industry is the second reason. Industry exports are the major indicators that 
reflect the competitive power of a defense industry abroad, and as expressed in previous 
pages, Turkish defense industry exports are very limited and, from the financial 
perspective, far behind the competing powers in the defense market. 
Uncertainty about membership in the European Union is the third reason. Because 
of this uncertainty, the long term effort of the collective European defense market has not 
been a focal point for Turkish defense industry companies. However, if Turkey enters the 
European Union, Turkish defense companies may respond to new changes with mergers 
and acquisitions, first inside the country and then with international companies.152 
E.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The primary research question analyzed in this chapter was “How did Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy affect the Turkish defense industry?” Financial 
variables of the defense industry and current program structures were analyzed to answer 
this question. Possible future challenges were analyzed to define prospective threats and 
opportunities and to make recommendations for future applications. The following pages 
summarize the analysis of these results. 
1. Financial Variables  
Turkey’s defense spending, industry sales, industry exports, R&D money, offset 
applications, and current program structures were the financial variables of the Turkish 
defense industry analyzed in this chapter. 
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Turkey’s defense spending and its relationship with Turkish defense industry 
sales were analyzed to determine the direction of government spending. The expected 
outcome of this analysis was a positive linear relationship because defense spending of a 
country, having developed defense industry, follows a similar path with defense industry 
sales. However, Turkey’s defense spending and industry sales had a negative relationship 
over 10 years, which is not so meaningful in the long run and cannot be sustainable. The 
primary reason for this negative relationship was determined to be the effect of the 
increase of the domestic contribution rate of the defense industry. Turkey is meeting 
defense needs and, compared to previous years, more acquisitions are coming from 
domestic defense industry companies than external companies. However, this proportion 
or rate is still far behind the developed countries. The current domestic contribution rate 
in Turkey is 41.6%, and this rate in most of the developed countries is between 80 and 
90%. Another point found in this analysis was about defense industry sales. Defense 
industry sales are important in determining the competitive power of a domestic defense 
industry, and analysis showed that the current figure was very low compared to the 
defense industry power of other developed countries. 
Next, industry exports were analyzed to determine the assembly line sustaining 
power and defense industry power from the export perspective. Industry exports, from the 
arms trade perspective, grew 14.7% on average, and industry exports as a whole grew 
19.7%. The growth rates followed increasing trends, which is very important for the 
defense industry. However, comparing the magnitude of exports showed that they were 
still far behind the developed countries, and with these growth rates it is nearly 
impossible to compete in the global market. Another point of analysis was the variety of 
industry exports . The Turkish defense industry had not made use of the experiences 
learned from fighting with terrorists and did not focus on products that were needed for 
fighting with terrorists until recent years. The other point found in this analysis was that 
industry exports were limited to only a couple of countries, which showed the need for 




republics, because of their national ties and nearness, as potential customers, and industry 
representatives residing in different countries could present a significant market for 
boosting industry exports.  
Offset applications were analyzed to determine their share in the defense trade 
and industry exports. The results showed that defense industry exports depended highly 
on offsets with 70%, but this offset rate was lower than most of the countries around the 
world. Another point about offset applications was that the offset share on imported 
defense products in previous years was higher than in current years. It was 91% between 
the years 1993 and 1999, but decreased to 46.6% between the years 1999 and 2005.  
The spending allocated for R&D was analyzed to determine the priority of R&D 
from both the government’s perspective and the industry perspective. From the 
government’s perspective, the importance of R&D for developing a domestic defense 
industry has not been realized. The money allocated for R&D purposes was much lower 
than both the European and the U.S. averages. From the defense industry perspective, 
their R&D percentage in sales was near the European company average and more than 
the U.S. company average; however, their magnitudes were much lower than other 
companies.  Another analysis was conducted to measure the R&D effects on both 
industry sales and industry exports. Both analyses showed that there was a strong 
relationship between these two variables and R&D. The money allocated for R&D 
affected both industry sales and industry exports positively. Based on this analysis, it can 
be concluded that if the money allocated for R&D is increased, it will increase industry 
sales and exports.  
Finally, current program structures were analyzed, from both the perspective of 
the number of programs and the financial perspective, in order to determine the order of 
precedence effects of defense systems acquisition policy on current programs. The results 
showed that all the programs were adding value to the Turkish defense industry, but still 
depended highly on foreign suppliers to produce or acquire major systems. From the 
value perspective, which expresses the magnitude of the programs, domestically 
developed programs only constituted 22% of all the programs.  
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2. Future Challenges 
Selected acquisition programs, global financial crisis, and industry mergers and 
acquisitions were analyzed to determine the future challenges of the defense industry. 
The Altay Main Battle Tank, as an example of domestic production, is very 
important for the Turkish defense industry because it will show the capabilities of the 
industrial base and will create a good opportunity for increasing industry exports. 
Similarly, the T-129 Atak Helicopter Program will add value to the Turkish defense 
industry. Other selected programs, such as the F-35 JSF and A400M aircrafts are the 
other biggest challenges for the Turkish defense industry. Increasing their share in these 
programs should be major objectives and have the potential to add substantially to the 
aviation technology base.  
The global financial crisis, although no measures have been considered to date, is 
another big challenge for the Turkish defense industry. No adjustments have been made 
in acquisition programs to date, but the value of the dollar is increasing against the 
Turkish lira every month. Considering that most agreements are made based on the 
dollar, if this increase continues, most of the acquisition programs will be more expensive 
than previously estimated. According to government acquisition officials, the defense 
industry will overcome this crisis and its effects by creating employment in defense 
companies through increased defense spending on domestic companies. Turkish defense 
industry companies’ high dependency on offsets in their exports is another important 
point that must be considered about the financial crisis. If they make adjustments to 
acquisition programs and cancel some of them, this will not only negatively affect 
defense industry companies and their trading partners, but it will also negatively affect 
defense industry exports, which depend on the 70% offsets.  
Mergers and acquisitions trends all over the world have not affected the Turkish 
defense industry to date, primarily because of three reasons: a high percentage (64%) of 




developing industry, and uncertainty about European Union membership. If Turkey is 
accepted into the European Union, it can be expected that company consolidations will 











V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  CONCLUSION 
The primary research question addressed in this thesis was: “How did Turkey’s 
defense systems acquisition policy affect the defense industry?” 
Answer: This policy and supporting strategies increased all the financial variables 
of the defense industry, but the increase of these variables was not enough to increase the 
competitive power of Turkish defense industry companies within the global defense 
market. According to second-tier industry development models, Turkey has not been able 
to reach the last phase, “complete independence of R&D and production.” However, the 
emphasis on this policy has structured current acquisition programs with value-adding 
approaches such as: domestic production, joint production, consortiums, and direct 
procurement, including 50% offset to the defense industry. 
This research was limited to financial variables and future challenges of the 
defense industry; product quality was outside the scope of this thesis. Further research 
should be conducted to address the quality and competitiveness of Turkish defense 
products.       
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
According to analysis conducted during this thesis, current trends are not enough 
to fulfill the major policy objective: an independent defense industry that can compete in 
the global defense market. In order to achieve this objective, the Turkish defense industry 
needs a big leap and serious government measures should be considered to provide this 
leap. 
Increasing the domestic contribution rate is not an easy objective that can be 
achieved in the short term; its increase depends heavily on other financial variables of the 
defense industry, such as sales, industry exports, offsets, and additional discretionary 
budget.  
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According to the analysis of the relationships between R&D and industry sales 
and between R&D and exports, there is a strong positive relationship between R&D and 
industry sales, and between R&D and exports. These relationships suggest that R&D 
money allocated for defense can increase both of these variables, if the R&D is 
thoughtfully constructed. R&D for defense has been neglected by the Turkish 
government so far, and it should be increased in order to fulfill policy objectives. 
Other ways to increase exports can be ministry-level political support, using 
industry representatives all over the world and using the experiences learned about 
fighting with terrorism on innovative product development. 
Offset shares on imported products should be increased to European levels 
(100%) in order to exploit the benefits of offsets more. 
Current joint programs, such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and the A400M, 
provide good opportunities for the Turkish defense industry that can help improve the 
technology and experience in the technology base. Turkey should increase its 
participation share to gain more from these programs. 
The global economic crisis has not been considered to date, but it may seriously 
affect multiple variables in the defense industry and increase the cost estimates of 
acquisition programs. Cutting some of these programs is likely to seriously damage both 
defense industry companies and their trading partners. On a more positive note, Defense 
spending can also be a great stimulus to lessen the effects of the financial crisis. 
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